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The thesis was born on 22 July 2003. It was the day when my research 
scholarship was renewed and also the day when I was accepted for the first-
ever conference.  
The conference was on interculturalism and because the subject matter 
was so new and the problems so unfamiliar, I contemplated a synthesis of my 
original thesis topic—a critique of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions—with cultural studies. The result was a short paper titled “The 
Ownership of Cultural Hybrids”—an experimental piece that argues that 
cultures are irreducibly hybridised because their central beliefs often undergo 
revolutions.  
From this original idea, I did more research in cultural studies and 
found Samuel Huntington’s characterisation of civilizations most problematic 
and most in need of philosophical attention, thus changing the course of my 
thesis topic. As I had not been trained in political science and history, this 
thesis had been a stretch of intellectual and emotional resources. It was a 
tiring but fulfilling experience.  
I wish to thank those who had made my journey so much smoother: the 
Graduate Studies Division for the research scholarship and for sponsoring two 
of my conference trips; my supervisor, A/P Cecilia Lim, for her good advice 
and for being patient despite repeated extensions and numerous conference 
trips; to my two examiners, who have helped polished the rough edges of my 
thesis; to the late H. L. A. Hart and Isaiah Berlin, whose works had helped me 
with the organization and the content of the thesis; to Jude Chua who played 




me the confidence to write for an international audience.  Special thanks must 
be given to Mrs. Deborah Tan and Mrs. Shirley Tan of Raffles Girls’ Secondary 
School for without their vision to make Philosophy a teaching subject, I would 
not have a ready avenue to refine my philosophical concepts. I am also 
grateful to my family for bringing “a little bit of home” to Singapore at the 
final stage of writing, to my wife, Esther Leong, for enlightening me on the 
concept of incommensurability and to God, for inspiring two thesis topics over 
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This work is a philosophical critique of Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of New World Order, an important text in 
current discourse on international relations. According to Huntington, the 
world can be divided into several distinct civilizations and civilizational 
beliefs/values (cultural values writ large) will determine how countries will act 
towards each other. Compacted within the book is the ideology of cultural 
essentialism in its three components. The first is that there is a core set of 
cultural beliefs that remains immutably important through time and defines 
the culture and civilization. The beliefs may be submerged but will resurrect in 
time. The second is that this set of beliefs is subscribed to by people of similar 
cultural descent, even if they migrate to other countries and in times of crisis, 
diasporas and kin countries will band together with the parent state. The third 
is the belief that these cultural values will determine how countries act 
towards each other and conflicts will inevitably arise because of 
incommensurability of values. To Huntington, cultural differences always 
portend clashes while cultural affinity will inevitably lead to harmony. Thus 
there is a clash between Islamic civilizations and other civilizations because 
“Islam has bloody borders”. All three assumptions are false. Cultural values 
are not fixed and immutable in their importance, either in time or across 
space. Cultural values are constantly reconstructed and due to historical 
myopia, we tend to see our set of values as built on previous set of values, 
when the current set of values is more likely a rebellion against the old set of 
values. There is no “given” in a culture that determines its course of 




structure because culture is necessarily diffused, with no final authority to 
settle disputes in interpretation, ensure conformity and punish deviants. That 
is why despite their common heritage, Western powers were at war for much 
of their history. Likewise differences do not necessarily lead to conflict and 
thus Singapore has managed to circumvent racial riots despite racial diversity. 
What matters in many cases are the leaders and their policies, rather than 
underlying cultural beliefs. When a country’s culture is seen as determining 
the actions of its political leaders, we are underestimating the importance of 




Chapter 1: The Clash of Civilizations? 
 
To neglect the field of political thought, because its unstable 
subject matter, with its blurred edges, is not to be caught by the 
fixed concepts, abstract models and fine instruments suitable to 
logic or to linguistic analysis…is merely to allow oneself to 
remain at the mercy of primitive and uncriticised political 
beliefs.       
Isaiah Berlin 
“Two Concepts of Liberty” 
   
I A Dangerous Metaphor 
The fin de siecle was a time of euphoria. There were wild celebrations of the 
new millennium and with it came promises of worldwide peace and harmony. 
The end of history, as political philosopher Francis Fukuyama proclaims, has 
arrived with the collapse of Communism and the world will be marked not by 
major conflicts but by the quiet triumph of liberal democracy. The prediction, 
along with the paean, crumbled on 11 Sept 2001, when two hijacked planes 
reduced the US World Trade Centre to rumbles of steel and concrete. Thus it 
ushers in a new era where political conflicts are seemingly driven by cultural 
rather than ideological (Communism and Fascism) factors. This is a 
prediction made by Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington in The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 1  and seems 
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hauntingly true. His controversial claim that “Islam has bloody borders”2 
receives much corroboration from the news. Many of the major conflicts and 
violence seem to be sparked off by Muslim terrorists—the bloody Chechnya 
rebellion when 150 people were left dead, the violence in Southern Thailand, 
the train bombing in Spain and the London bombing. Is Islamic culture an 
inherently violent one? Can Huntington be wrong about civilizational clashes 
just like we were wrong about the end of history? This thesis aims to answer 
many of such questions.  
To be sure, Huntington’s thesis is not restricted to the infamous 
prediction of clashes between Islamic and other civilizations, but it argues that 
“culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization 
identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in 
the post-Cold War world”3. That explains a spectrum of political events over 
the decades—from the largely rhetorical debate between Asian and Western 
values to the bloody clashes in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, to the perennial 
difficulty of Turkey to get into the European Union.  The stake is high and that 
is why when Huntington published an earlier but shorter piece in the 
prestigious Foreign Affairs in 1993, it generated more debates in three years 
than any article since the 1940s4.  The flurry of responses from politicians, 
policy makers and political scientists is markedly contrasted with lukewarm 
responses from professional philosophers. To my limited knowledge, there is 
no concerted philosophical reaction to the clash of civilizations thesis. The 
situation is peculiar. Are political philosophers neglecting the problem 
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 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1996), 258. 
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 Ibid., 20.  
4




because it belongs to policy studies and not philosophy? Or are they so 
engrossed with traditional political problems that they are unaware of the 
current war of ideas? For as late Oxford don Isaiah Berlin observes, “If 
philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor’s study could 
destroy a civilisation… may it not be that only other professors, or, at least 
other thinkers (and not governments or congressional committees), can alone 
disarm them?”5  Without sounding immodest, this thesis aims to fill up the 
gap in philosophical attention and show the feasibility of a philosophical 
critique.    
Admittedly Huntington’s thesis is a work of political science rather than 
philosophy and one may question the possibility and merit of a philosophical 
critique. In reply it must be agreed from the onset that much of Huntington’s 
theoretical assumptions have been derived from a larger metaphysical 
tradition, even though such assumptions may have been made unconsciously. 
I thus understand metaphysics to be foundational thinking while theories are 
derivatives. The demand for the justification of a theory or any claim cannot 
progress indefinitely and must ultimately stop at a point, which is the realm of 
metaphysical assumptions. Or in other words, metaphysics is the larger 
metaphor, from which other metaphors are derived and become sensible. The 
metaphysical doctrine of essentialism, for example, has been expressed in a 
variety of metaphors—such as the harmony of different players in an orchestra 
and synthesis of various parts into the whole6. It is part of my presentation to 
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 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. Henry Hardy and 
Roger Hausheer (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997), 192.  
6
 Isaiah Berlin, “The Originality of Machiavelli”, in The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. Henry Hardy 




situate Huntington’s work within a philosophical tradition that can be 
identified as essentialism.  
 While many political commentators dispute specific claims made by 
Huntington, they often do not go deep enough in uncovering the source of 
error.  For Huntington is not the first and unlikely to be the last to propose the 
clash of civilizations thesis. There is a need to look at the metaphysical 
framework, which has largely been unquestioned, that supports such a thesis. 
We can see it from a contemporary example. In a reply to Johns Hopkins 
professor Fouad Ajami who disputes the clash between Christian-majority 
Armenia and Muslim-majority Azerbaijan, political analyst Robert Kaplan 
concedes that “because Huntington’s brush is broad, his specifics are 
vulnerable to attack”. But he rescues Huntington from rebuttal by pointing out 
a more likely flashpoint—a clash between Turkish and Iranian civilizations7.  
As seen from the exchange, Huntington’s larger hypothesis about the clash of 
civilizations can remain intact as long as the debate is largely a dispute over 
where the war of civilizations is taking place. Data can be revised and 
refurbished to advance the same argument. This is not to say that empirical 
data is inconsequential to the debate. In fact, whether Huntington’s claims are 
true or not are ultimately dependent on empirical facts. However, if we 
question his characterizations of civilizations, and can prove that such 
characterizations do not correspond to the actual development of cultures or 
civilizations, then his arguments would be considerably weakened.  Hence we 
should challenge Huntington with deeper and more fundamental questions.   
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 Robert D Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”, in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century, ed. 




 Thus in this thesis, I am asking categorically different questions from 
usual political commentaries. I am not as interested in the content of specific 
cultures as a feature of civilization that Huntington puts forth. I am not asking, 
“What is an Islamic culture?”, “What is a Chinese culture?” though such 
questions are important. This class of arguments, as seen from the Asian-
Western values debates, tends to be inconclusive, with one camp arguing that 
certain values cause the rise or fall of those cultures while the other camp 
denying the role of such values.  What I am asking is a more fundamental 
question of the developmental pattern of a culture. As such, I shall critically 
examine Huntington’s definition of a culture as “values, norms, institutions 
and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society 
attached primary importance”8 where “a civilization is a culture writ large”9.  
It is important to clarify our point of difference. I agree with 
Huntington that culture is a set of values, norms, institutions and modes of 
thinking that successive generations in society attached primary importance if 
it spreads over a considerable number of generations. (This will include 
ideologies10, philosophies and religious beliefs, etc.) This is understandable as 
cultural norms are relatively stable and can resist changes over a relatively 
long period. In short, I agree that there is constancy in cultural values over a 
period of time. However, I think Huntington is making a strong claim than 
this. He is arguing for the immutability of core values—that there is a set of 
core beliefs that will secure its primary status within the civilization as long as 
the civilization remains intact:  
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 Samuel Huntington, 41.  
9 Ibid., 41.  
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 Ideologies like the rule of law and democracy should be seen as separate from actual legal and 





Civilizations are mortal but also very long-lived; they evolve, 
adapt and are the most enduring of human associations…Their 
“unique and particular essence” is “their long historical 
continuity. Civilization is in fact the longest story of all.” Empires 
rise and fall, governments come and go, civilizations remain and 
“survive political, social, economic and even ideological 
upheavals.” “International history,” Bozeman concludes, “rightly 
documents the thesis that political systems are transient 
expedients on the surface of civilization, and the destiny of each 
linguistically and morally unified community depends ultimately 
upon the survival of certain primary structuring ideas around 
which successive generations have coalesced and which thus 
symbolize the society’s continuity.”11 
 
This view, which can be termed the essentialist model of culture i.e. 
there are timeless, unchanging essences in a particular culture despite 
political, social, economic and even ideological revolutions, is the bedrock of 
the clash of civilizations thesis.  Since cultural essentialism describes social 
affairs, it inevitably makes certain assumptions about human nature, which 
we will explore in detail in subsequent chapters. In brief, the theory assumes 
that individuals within the culture are more or less uniform in their core 
beliefs and there is lack of choice in their adoption of cultural beliefs.   
Whether there is a necessary connection between a culture and its core 
beliefs across time and space is the subject of this thesis. Specifically, I will 
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explore whether there is any necessary connection between Islam and violence; 
between Chinese civilization and Confucianism and corruption and between 
Western civilization and Christianity. In other words, is it true that in every 
instance when we encounter the culture or civilization, either in the past, 
present or future or in other geographical locations, we will discover the same 
set of core values that separates it from other civilizations? One practical 
outcome of this seemingly esoteric inquiry is that if Islam and violence are in 
fact separable, it means that the Islamic world does not have to engage in the 
cycle of violence. It means that policy makers would have committed post hoc 
if they had blamed Islam for acts of terrorism. 
My paper is thus not contending against the constancy of core beliefs 
but against the immutability of core beliefs, which brings about dangerous 
implications in domestic and foreign policies. I understand immutability to 
mean a set of beliefs that defines a civilization right from the start and 
remains in its esteemed position despite political, social and economic 
upheavals. It seems to contradict Huntington’s own definition of culture, for if 
a culture is defined as what successive generations value, and when a new 
generation revolts against the older values, by what mechanism are these 
essential concepts preserved? Are there sacred beliefs that cannot be 
overthrown?  I contend that no such beliefs exist but rather the constancy of 
core values is mistaken for their immutability.  In stable societies, values are 
preserved for centuries and sometimes for a millennium (such as the 
supremacy of Catholicism) but with great changes in society or the political 
systems, these values can be partly replaced with a new set of core values. 
Over time, and over numerous intellectual, political or economical revolutions, 




in the culture but their importance and status have changed after the 
revolutions. I aim to show that this is true in my thesis.   
It must be clarified that certain universal values which are crucial for 
the survival of any society—such as trust, a prohibition of random violence to 
people or property—remain important even after the revolution. In a society 
without any form of trust, it is hard to imagine how daily activities can be 
carried out. No one can safely walk on the streets, neither can any transaction 
be carried out because there is simply no trust to ensure that the other partner 
will honour the deal. It is questionable whether a community can exist in the 
first place. So values whose absence would cause the immediate collapse of a 
society are not in dispute. These values are limited in number and those two 
that I have mentioned shall fall into the category. Huntington too agrees to the 
existence of such universal values but he claims that above and beyond this set 
of values is another set of values that separate one civilization from another. 
The difference between us is that while he sees such beliefs will inevitably 
identify the civilization, I think they are merely contingently linked. The 
inability to distinguish the accidental from the essential is the key weakness in 
Huntington’s thesis. As a result, his analysis obscures more than illuminates 
the features of a civilization and the nature of its interaction with other 
civilizations. Because of its descriptive poverty, translating such analyses into 
policies results in focusing on the wrong set of issues and neglecting the real 
problems. 
In subsequent chapters, I will dismantle Huntington’s assumptions 




This method, which is termed the skeptical method 12 , deviates from the 
normal mode of inquiry where one constructs a comprehensive theory to 
explain various events, has its roots in the teachings of Socrates.  Socrates was 
famous for challenging his opponents’ concepts to the point of incoherence. 
However, he rarely gave his own definitions of the challenged concept at the 
end of the dialogues. This method may seem unfamiliar to many readers but 
as philosophers Roger Ames and David Hall note: 
 
Belief in the character of thinking as benignly skeptical and 
open-ended reflects the attitude that open-ended enquiry, not 
the creation of systems or the promulgation of doctrines, defines 
the philosophic task. The belief that the search for truth is 
valuable even if no systematically certain truths have yet been 
discovered, remains a continuing part of the philosophic 
tradition13.  
 
Descartes too starts his meditation with the skeptical method where he 
casts doubt on his senses with the dream argument, the deceiving God 
argument and finally with an evil genius hypothesis.  The construction of 
rationalism and the subsequent proof of the existence of God come after his 
demolition of the old foundation.  It is commonly acknowledged that while his 
first chapter remains a strong skeptical argument, his arguments for the 
existence of God and the external world are prone to deep errors. Even the 
famous cogito ergo sum is guilty of the fallacy of petitio principii and attempts 
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to rescue it from such criticism have failed.  Thus it illustrates the vulnerability 
of a theory and is a common theme in the philosophy of science. Any theory, 
no matter how popular or authoritative, is open to falsification. I believe the 
clash of civilizations thesis is no exception to the rule.  
Besides being a method used by philosophers, the skeptical method has 
an advantage over the positive method of creating a theory to critique another 
theory.  For by critiquing a theory using a second theory, the former may look 
flawed in relation to the latter but it may only be so from the viewpoint of the 
second theory. For example, utilitarianism may seem incoherent and 
unprincipled when perceived by Kantian ethics but it would be a more 
powerful argument if it can be shown that utilitarianism is internally 
incoherent and the claims of utilitarianism cannot be easily sustained.  
After exposing the weaknesses of Huntington’s characterization of 
culture, I will produce a brief outline of the developmental patterns of a 
culture. It must be emphasized that culture is one of the most complex 
concepts and defining it has perplexed many great minds. It is beyond my 
current capability to produce a comprehensive theory of culture, which 
requires years of research. Rather I shall stand on the shoulder of an 
influential philosopher to illuminate certain features of culture which have 
been neglected by Huntington in his commitment to cultural essentialism. 
While not fool-proof, I think the new model can lead us nearer to the truth 
than Huntington’s model. Borrowing from philosopher Thomas Kuhn, I will 
synthesize insights from the philosophy of science with cultural studies. In a 
sense, this work has been anticipated by him when he writes, “to the extent 
that the book (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) portrays scientific 




cumulative breaks, its theses are undoubtedly of wide applicability. But they 
should be, for they are borrowed from other fields. Historians of literature, of 
music, of the arts, of political development, and of many other human 
activities have long described their subjects in the same way”14. What my 
thesis does is to bring this notion of revolution back into cultural studies.  
I suggest that it is inaccurate to view a culture as an accumulation of 
norms, institutions and modes of thinking from time immemorial. Certain 
cultural values are held to be important within a period but not after a cultural 
revolution. Revolutions need not be violent and bloody protests but can be 
peaceful ones like the Kantian revolution mentioned earlier. They need not be 
strictly cultural in origin but can start from economic and political spheres 
(such as the shift from monarchy to democracy15) with repercussions on the 
cultural fabric at large. What is common in all revolutions is that perspectives 
change. Norms, values and institutions which are seen as vital in the previous 
generations are no longer held with equal fervency in the subsequent 
generations.  
 Hence, my dispute with Huntington’s description of culture is that it is 
too stagnant, too inflexible to change. He allows evolution of peripheral beliefs 
but he thinks that the core values will remain immutable. However, vital 
values and beliefs are subject to changes more often than we assume. They can 
undergo evolution and revolution. Thus for a certain period of time, the 
dominant paradigm or culture can provide the most satisfying answer to the 
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 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3
rd
 Edition) (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 108. 
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 A political system is different from culture in the sense that the former is more structured, with a 
clear line of command and there is a final authority to issue any policy. Culture is more diffused and 
has multiple centres of authority.  Nonetheless, it is possible for the political system to shape the values 
and norms of the people. For example, democracy originally refers to the procedure of selecting 
political leaders by voting. But this method of selection has since been extended to non-political 




question of what constitutes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of 
people.  In many modern societies, materialism seems to be the greatest 
source of happiness to many.  The forms and expressions may evolve but the 
basic paradigm remains constant.  
But this will not be the permanent state of affair. With each epoch, 
especially one that involves intercultural exchanges, there is a radical 
departure from thinking of previous periods. Even if the once-dominant 
culture still exists, its place, prestige and purpose in that society has been 
usurped by the challenger culture. Even if similar practices still remain, the 
significance of these behaviours has changed. The re-orientation of values 
constitutes a radical departure from the past. The rise of spiritualism in 
several societies is a challenge to materialism and when the majority embraces 
spiritualism instead of materialism, a revolution can be said to have taken 
place.   
An apology is in place. Given the breadth and scope of Huntington’s 
work, this work cannot hope to repeat such a feat and the reader must be 
content with less. I shall be focusing on three principal civilizations—the 
Western, Sinic and Islamic civilizations as these are the main players in 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations. Philosophical mistakes Huntington 
makes in his analysis of these three civilizations are likewise extended to his 
analysis of other civilisations and readers are most welcome to do the 
necessary inferences. Furthermore, as I am interested in the philosophical 
rather than the empirical aspect of his work, much of the empirical data 
presented in his work is not disputed here. Other abler works should address 





II The Manner of Proceeding 
With these cleared, we are in a better position to discuss the central 
issues of the thesis. Chapter 2 examines the philosophical background of 
essentialism and how the doctrine has been used in history to perpetuate 
colonialism, racism and discrimination. It shows that academic knowledge is 
not divorced from politics and in fact can drive political decisions. 
Essentialism is far from a forgotten idea and has perpetuated itself in 
international discourse on culture and civilizations.  The chapter further 
examines how multiculturalism may not adequately remove the assumption of 
essentialism.  The underlying assumption affects how Huntington constructs 
the idea of cultures—as distinct cultures that will inevitably come into conflict. 
In contrast, I will highlight Will Kymlicka’s model of multiculturalism and 
how he tries to cut through the cultural factor and address underlying issues 
of fairness of integration, justice and liberalism.  
Chapter 3 explores whether there are values that are permanent and 
agreed as of primary importance by successive generations in a particular 
civilization.  Or are these central values only constant for a period, albeit for a 
long period and would be reordered or discarded in a cultural revolution?  I 
will show that Huntington is wrong to say that core values will remain 
immutable in any society. A value may be closely identified with a culture for a 
long period of time, even for more than a millennium but it does not mean 
that this will remain the permanent state of affair. An example is the 
increasing separation between Christianity and Western culture. Once a 
foundation of Western society, Christianity has lost its dominance and 
succeeded by secularism. The loss of these core values does not necessarily 




Chapter 4 explores whether people within a civilization share a core set 
of values even though they are geographically apart. This chapter examines 
whether there is a necessary connection between a culture and its values 
across space. The close examination of a segment of the Chinese diasporas 
show that migrant Chinese used to identify China as their homeland but due 
to various circumstances, there was a shift in consciousness. And moving on 
to the civilizational level, I criticise the core-periphery state concept in 
Huntington’s book because it does not correspond to the actual situation. So 
the idea of a core state, distributing a set of values that unites it to peripheral 
states is highly untenable.   
Chapter 5 examines whether clashes between civilizations and cultures 
are inevitable and what roles leaders and individuals can play in conflicts. The 
choice is really between the personal and the impersonal theory of history. 
The impersonal theory, which Huntington proposes, is that civilizational 
values are like plate tectonics, moved by the forces of nature, and will clash 
inevitably. Individuals are unable to stop the force of this movement. While 
the force of tradition and customary rule may frequently override individuals’ 
wills, there are also periods when collective human efforts can change the 
course of human event. This is termed the personal theory of history. This is 
possible because there is no necessary connection between a culture and its 
values across time and space, as established in the previous chapters. Since 
individuals are able to choose to deviate from cultural norms, even from 
centuries of violence, they are able to create a new culture, to create a new set 
of norms, institutions and values for the society at large.  
Chapter 6 attempts to construct an outline of the possible theory of a 




necessary connection between a culture and its values across space and time. 
It shows a more amorphous development of culture, which retains its 
distinction but is more transient and more open to revolutions than the 
essentialist position. The non-linear development of a culture takes into 
account the incommensurability of worldviews and the creativity of humans.  
Chapter 7 shows how the two concepts of culture can affect the way we 
frame political problems and what can be done to minimise the ongoing 
conflicts. There are several imageries packed within the concept of cultural 
essentialism. My thesis questions the image of a civilization as an enclosed 
and static entity that seem to have little interaction with other units and when 
they interact, they are like continental plates that will clash with one another. 
Just as humans are unable to stop the natural forces, the role of the individual 
is reduced to the minimum in this age of cultural conflicts. Changing the 
metaphors that we hold of a culture and a civilization will affect how we think 














Chapter 2: Cultural Essentialism  
 
The Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely there, 





Having mentioned the concept of cultural essentialism, it is the aim of this 
chapter to show that essentialism is not merely a philosophy that has no 
bearing on politics and culture. Indeed the philosophy of essentialism was 
most prominent during the Enlightenment when imperialists used the 
European standard to judge whether a culture was civilised or not. It was seen 
as the white man’s burden to spread the European values overseas and this 
paradigm had the support of many intellectuals, consciously or sub-
consciously. Even in today’s international discourse, the ideas of a universal 
civilization or the end of history are parts of the essentialist doctrine.  Section 
II argues that certain strands of multiculturalism, including Huntington’s, still 
suffer from essentialism.  
Essentialism is the belief that individuals or phenomena have 
properties and purposes that are indispensable to their identities. The 
essentialist outlook is part of the transcendent framework and a principle or 
being A can be termed to be transcendent if the meaning and definition of 
another principle or being, B, is dependent on it but not vice versa16. This is 
exemplified by the Christian doctrine of an uncreated and transcendent God 
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who can determine the meaning of the world without being in turn defined by 
his creation. Since God created each person for a specific purpose, it led to the 
medieval thinking that there were fixed stations in life and social mobility was 
discouraged.  As such, according to Hall and Ames, “Any recourse to 
transcendent principles inevitably leads to a substance view of oneself… 
Rational principles require rational beings to implement them. Moral 
principles require moral beings to enact them…It is such characterisation that 
renders the agent into a substantial being—that is, a being with an essence”17.  
Thus one acts naturally by following one’s essence.  
Since objects and agents are defined by essences and do not derive 
identities from one another, they are sharply distinguished from one another. 
For example, there is a radical separation between the Creator and the created 
and between God and Satan. This dualism that posits two substances as 
radical opposites has influenced much of Western philosophical categories: 
good and evil, mind and body, self and the other.  Binary opposites are often 
seen as mutually exclusive, occupying no common ground between them, and 
by aligning oneself to a principle, one is seen as antithetical to another.  
To make our analysis even more rigorous, it is necessary to understand 
what other qualities essentialism entails besides dualism. According to 
philosopher of science Paul Griffiths, it has three other components: 
development fixity, species nature and intended outcome. Though these 
concepts are used in the concept of genetics, they are equally pertinent in 
cultural studies.  The first is the view of development fixity. The concept 
means that a trait is insensitive to changes in the environment and any 
deviation from its goal-oriented development is considered impairment and 
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frustrations18. It is famously expressed by the fact that an acorn has no other 
way of developing except to be an oak tree. Even if the environment is 
unfavourable, it does not change its course of development. When applied to 
cultures, it assumes that a culture will remain on its fixed developmental path 
despite changes and influences from other cultures, which are viewed as 
frustrations of its ends. This view assumes that a civilization already possesses 
certain essences when it begins and over time, the potentiality will be realised.  
Species nature means that certain innate traits reflect the character of a 
category or class of organism or a culture, with frequent association with 
universality or typicality19. For example, humans are considered distinct from 
other animals because they possess intellectual faculties. In the cultural 
context, it is assumed that a particular culture is distinct from another culture 
because of certain unchanging values. More than that, it provides the raison 
d’etre for membership within a community—by subscription to the core set of 
values that defines a culture. Thus one is distinct from a person from another 
culture by the values one holds. Diasporas are assumed to hold on to the same 
core values as those in the parent countries and Huntington doubts their 
loyalty to the host country.   
Intended outcome means the innate traits determine how the organism 
or culture is meant to develop. To be deprived of them is to be malformed and 
environments that inhibit them are considered “bad rearing”20.  Thus, one is 
expected to be a rational being because one possesses thinking ability. To 
develop the essence of one’s being is to discover one’s destiny and one’s 
purpose in life. In cultural essentialism, there is an obligation to carry out 
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practices predominant in a culture in order to be accepted by the community.  
This often leads to the assumption that membership in a community is 
defined by the ability to speak the mother tongue.  
When the language of essentialism descends upon cultures and 
civilizations, it implies that a culture or a civilization has certain core traits 
that resist changes and distinguish it from other cultures and civilizations. The 
essence defines the purpose of the civilizations and subsequently frustration 
and stunted growth comes from changes to its core values, either from other 
cultures or internal collapse. Losing one’s essence means losing one’s identity 
and purposes. Of course, peripheral values can be discarded without 
damaging the culture but within the dualistic framework, interaction between 
cultures is seen as detrimental to the essential core of these cultures and 
should be vigorously discouraged. 
Two qualifications must be made. First the essentialist position does 
not subscribe to the immutability of all values and institutions. It freely admits 
that civilizations can adapt and evolve over time but insists that there are core 
values that remain unchanged despite upheavals.  In Huntington’s works, he 
readily admits that certain cultural values can be discarded over time. For 
example, where America once felt passionately about race and ethnicity, they 
no longer do so. Historically, white Americans have distinguished themselves 
from blacks, Asians, Mexicans and Indians and excluded them from the 
American community but with the civil rights movement, such 
discriminations have petered out gradually. Huntington however notes that 




society21. These values may remain dormant but will resurrect in time to come. 
This is what Ajami means when he says: 
 
Huntington has found his civilizations whole and intact, 
watertight under an eternal sky. Buried alive, as it were, during 
the years of the Cold War, these civilizations (Islamic, Slavic-
Orthodox, Western, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, etc) rose as 
soon as the stone was rolled off, dusted themselves off and 
proceeded to claim the loyalty of their adherents.22  
 
 Second, the essentialist position argues that certain values can persist 
despite human failings. For example, “during the phase of absolutism in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the rule of law was observed more in 
breach than in reality”23, but taken as a whole, there are certain practices like 
the rule of law that form the “continuing core of Western civilization” 24. Thus 
it seems that there is a set of values that persists in a civilization despite 
travesty by political leaders and ordinary individuals on a regular basis. That 
seems to contradict Huntington’s own definition of culture as “values, norms, 
institutions and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given 
society attached primary importance”25. For in the period when the rule of law 
was not largely practised or seen as the norm, it was simply not a part of the 
culture. That is how we describe countries with weak legal systems like the 
Philippines and Indonesia.   
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It seems that these core values or essences, of which the rule of law is 
one of them, are like impersonal and transcendent forces or zeitgeist that 
govern the growth of a civilization and remain untouched despite individual 
failings.  So they become abstract and metaphysical entities whose existence is 
independent of the persons who compose them. In such a world, the 
responsibility for all actions must ultimately be traced to such a force. Thus, 
people in a particular civilization are prone to violence because they are driven 
by cultural forces.  Evidence against this claim is not refutation but failure to 
see the invisible force that is driving the direction of history or movement of 
people of the same cultural descent. Berlin debunks essentialism as 
“profoundly anti-empirical”.  For if essentialism were supported by empirical 
evidence, it can be refuted but even if there is counter-evidence, it can be 
claimed that the mind is too weak or feeble to detect the underlying causes 26. 
As the ultimate justification for essentialism is self-contained, it is hard to 
refute and historically has driven many social and political decisions. We shall 
chart a short history of essentialism and show how it has been translated to 
colonialism, monoculturalism and other forms of oppression.  
 
I One Essence 
The Enlightenment was the period in which essentialism became an 
important doctrine.  Awakened from their intellectual slumber, Europeans 
saw it as a burden and their destiny to spread their virtues abroad. In the 
name of civilizing other “primitive tribes”, they committed numerous 
atrocities like slavery, colonialism, racial discrimination and war. By creating 
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a standard that was attainable by one culture, all other cultures were seen as 
the binary opposite—barbaric, uncivilised and unenlightened. It was a familiar 
argument that except Western culture, other cultures did not have scientific 
and philosophical traditions or literature worthy of emulation.   The dominant 
culture took the position that inventions and discoveries from other cultures 
were not significant until they were assimilated into the dominant culture. It 
was said that though the Chinese invented paper, gunpowder, printing and the 
magnet, it was the Europeans who truly utilised them. Similarly, despite 
acknowledging the Arabs and the Hindus as pioneers of the numeral system 
the extent of their mathematical achievements have not fully acknowledged 
until recent decades.  
After suppressing the fact that other traditions do possess science and 
mathematics, the textbook account of history is a Eurocentric one. In the 
classic Eurocentric model, mathematical development is seen as taking place 
in two eras—in Greece, from about 600B.C. to 300A.D. and in post-
Renaissance Europe. The intervening period of stagnation was labelled as the 
Dark Ages where no great scientific and mathematical thoughts arose27. While 
much research has been done to expose the stereotypes and unpublicised 
histories, most textbooks and popular texts still do not reflect the new 
research findings. One result is that other cultures feel emasculated from their 
rich history. Dispossessed of their cultural achievements, Muslims feel 
alienated from modernity. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
laments contemporary Muslims’ reluctance to acquire scientific and 
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mathematical knowledge when the so-called “Western” or “secular” 
knowledge owed much to Muslim thinkers like Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd.28  
It is under the shadow of such cultural bias that sociologist Max Weber 
and other Western intellectuals have started to see non-Western cultures as 
weak, inferior and backward. Weber for example famously claims that 
capitalism could not have originated from Chinese, Muslim and Hindu 
civilizations because they lack the worldview and work ethics of the 
Protestants. 29  While Weber does mention that capitalism can be easily 
transplanted outside of its area of origin, it is arguable that elements of 
capitalism cannot be found in other civilizations.  Again, he seems to subscribe 
to the idea that only the West is capable of producing great ideas.  
The belief that other civilizations were not truly civilised was one of the 
prime motivations for colonialism. It had spurred Britain, France and other 
superpowers to rob other countries of their sovereignty.  Even intellectuals 
were so convinced of the humanitarian purpose that they had written in 
support of colonialism. One striking example is philosopher John Stuart Mill. 
Mill vigorously urged the British Empire to actively conquer more of India. 
Unmentioned was how Britain’s near monopoly of opium production had 
severely weakened the physical health of citizens in India and China. 
Oblivious to such facts, intentionally or unintentionally, Mill praised his 
country for acting only “in the service of others”, desiring “no benefit to itself 
at the expense of others”. England was “bent on ending inhumanity”, 
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motivated by pure altruism and uniquely dedicated to the highest “principles 
and values” though sadly misunderstood by cynical Europeans30.     
Ironically, Mahathir who is most famous for his anti-western rhetoric 
has not repealed the colonial legacy of “race” in the Malaysian Constitution. 
The Constitution defines “Malays as people who not only profess Islam, and 
conform to Malay custom and also habitually speak the Malay language”, all of 
which are fluid concepts. Sir Stamford Raffles was most influential in crafting 
the idea of a “Malay” race or nation. Like other important English writers of 
his period, Raffles adopted the Enlightenment view that people should be 
scientifically classified31.  Many Europeans in this era believed that race could 
be determined on biological grounds regardless of how people defined 
themselves32. Thus the categories of “Malay”, “Chinese” and “Indian” and 
“Eurasian” were used in censuses and legislation. Ultimately, through these 
racial categories, the colonial masters hoped to divide and rule the populace. 
By exploiting the inherent mistrust of the others, they managed to prevent 
unity among the races and extend their rule. It is a colonial invention that has 
gone largely unchallenged in the post-colonial world33.  
In the realm of international relations, Fukuyama is in a way adopting 
the monoculturalist framework in his work, “The End of History?” where he 
argues that the search for the ideal political and economic system has ended 
with the success of capitalism and liberal democracy, both Western inventions. 
The world will enter a period of harmony because no longer would there be 
                                                 
30
 Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 44-45. Quotes by 
J.S. Mill are taken from this book.  
31
 Anthony Reid, “Melayu as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities”, in Contesting Malayness, ed. 
Timothy Barnard  (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2004), 10. 
32
 Ibid, 16.  
33 Adrian Vickers, ‘“Malay Identity’: Modernity, Invented Tradition and Forms of Knowledge”, in 





global struggles over ideologies, political and economic models but all would 
work to embrace liberal democracy. Time would be devoted to solving 
mundane technical and economic problems34. While he may ultimately be 
proven true, it is by no means clear at this stage that all states are adopting or 
on their way to adopting these models for their societies. Some Arab countries 
like Iran are rejecting the Western model in favour of theocracy. Huntington 
rightly rejects Fukuyama’s view as “too divorced from reality”35.  
Fukuyama’s view is part of the idea of a universal civilization. This is 
the concept propounded by many, who claim that a world culture has emerged. 
But according to Huntington, this ideal is a fallacy and he shows that there is 
no consensus on a common language (even though English is widely spoken, 
the number of speakers pales in comparison to other languages like 
Mandarin), a common culture and a common religion. Other than being 
unable to account for these facts, the notion suffers from three mistaken 
assumptions. One is the single alternative fallacy. Though communism has 
collapsed, liberal democracy is by no means the winner in the market of ideas. 
Religions and various ideologies are fighting for adherents. Second, increased 
interaction does not lead to a common culture. Technological advance, 
international trade and economic interdependence have not curbed conflicts. 
Third is the confusion between Westernization and modernization. Western 
civilization was formed in the eighth and ninth century but did not modernize 
till seventeenth to eighteenth century. Many societies have modernized 
without being Westernized36. In the final analysis, Fukuyama’s analysis is 
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fallacious because he does not recognize that individuals have competing 
visions of the good life, which cannot be dissolved by the influx of technology 
and a common language.  
  
III Many Essences  
In reaction to monoculturalism, multiculturalism tries to repair the 
damages wrought by cultural monopoly, working on the assumption that each 
culture has as much to contribute as the dominant culture. The intense search 
for what properly belongs to each culture and civilization is like a tidal wave, 
sweeping across the globe. It has directed academics, politicians and social 
leaders to eradicate all forms of political incorrectness and acknowledge the 
vital roles played by minority groups. In all disciplines, canons are revised, 
expanded and pluralised. The recognition of the achievements of other 
cultures has restored dignity and pride to various ethnic groups. To take an 
example, consider the multicultural history of mathematics. As an alternative 
to the Eurocentric model mentioned earlier, multiculturalists have presented a 
complex web of interaction among various civilizations during the eighth and 
fifteenth century, the period described as the “Dark Ages”37. So we have China 
interacting closely with India and the Arabs while the Arabs and the Hindus 
simultaneously maintained a close relationship with the Hellenistic world. It 
was the Arabs who finally brought their knowledge westward, from Baghdad 
to Sicily, Cairo, Cordoba and Toledo, spreading their influence to the 
Europeans 38 .  Many new questions have mushroomed as a result and a 
comprehensive coverage of the activities between civilizations remains a work 
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in progress.  Once multicultural history gains currency and credibility, 
textbooks and opinions will be revised as well.  
Undoubtedly multiculturalism has raised various cultures and their 
achievements to a higher pedestal but to see each culture as an impregnable 
fortress, constantly at war with one another, forms its weakest link. This of 
course does not apply to the entire spectrum of multiculturalism like Will 
Kymlicka’s version of multiculturalism but there are important camps in 
multiculturalism that endorse the position described. Mahathir, for example, 
at the end of his reign, frequently blamed the West for a litany of crimes—from 
currency speculation to attempts to re-colonise the Malays. By resorting to 
such rhetoric, he tried to shift attention from inherent instability in domestic 
politics to forge a common enemy. Huntington too criticizes the antagonistic 
attitudes multiculturalists adopt toward America’s identification with Western 
civilizations. By denial of a common American heritage and reducing Western 
civilization to nothing more than its crimes, these multiculturalists are seen as 
ethno-separatist39. 
Kymlicka, on the other hand, tries to apply liberal principles to the area 
of multiculturalism and argues that justice and fairness is best served by 
allowing minority rights. If minority groups have to be assimilated into the 
national culture, the process can be best achieved by having fair terms of 
integration, such as the provision of mother tongue education, changes to 
curriculum (such as the inclusion of the multicultural history of science as 
given above), giving affirmative action so that the minority groups would not 
be systematically disadvantaged, etc40. Ethnic conflicts usually start when 
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minority groups are systematically marginalized and forcefully assimilated 
within local culture. They are expected to demonstrate their loyalty by 
abandoning traditional practices, language and values. Hence, not examining 
the terms of integration is to privilege the existing culture of the majority. 
Kymlicka’s approach, which does not attribute all the blame to cultural factors, 
is a better approach to seeking underlying problems.    
This issue of fair terms of integration can be overlooked in the beauty of 
multiculturalism.  We do not have to look far to know that Malaysia, while 
boasting of a multi-ethnic society, is still divided along racial lines. 
Government policies can perpetuate racially discriminatory practices. In 
universities in Malaysia, Malays and non-Malays are polarized, each belonging 
to own enclaves and hardly interact. While there used to be racial quotas for 
admission into universities, it has given way to meritocracy. However, due to 
different admission examinations, where Malay students usually take 
university matriculation examinations, and non-Malays attempt the much 
harder STPM exam (equivalent of GCE A Level), the proportion of Malay 
students entering universities has actually increased. At the same time, top 
students from other races are perennially denied courses or universities of 
their choices.  The unfairness of the system has cast doubt on meritocracy. 
Attempts to integrate races via Vision Schools, where primary school children 
of different medium of instruction share the same school premises, has 
resulted in failure because Chinese educationists and Indian educationists fear 
the erosion of their indigenous education. Peace and harmony rests not on 
mutual understanding but the lack of interaction. So the danger in being 




the cultural groups. Multiculturalism is still shackled in the essentialist 
framework, perceiving each culture as independent of one another.  
Thus multiculturalism can be a fighting creed. While it celebrates 
various cultural achievements, the boundaries between cultures are sharply 
defined according to the perceived essences. Pushed to its logical conclusion, 
we have Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations, in which battlefields are 
drawn between civilizations. Huntington builds his case, as mentioned earlier, 
by attacking the alternative model of a universal civilization. He argues that 
commonality between civilizations is superficial and there are real and distinct 
differences that cannot be resolved by economic, technological and political 
exchanges. Due to the overwhelming dominance of the Western culture, each 
culture has to react to it. They can reject both Westernization and 
modernization, accept both or reject the former and embrace the latter. The 
first approach is rarely adopted nowadays, while the second approach will lead 
to torn countries like Mexico and Turkey. The final approach is most favoured 
by numerous non-Western countries and it has strengthened these cultures at 
the expense of the West41. As each civilization recovers from colonial rule or 
oppression by the superpowers, they become autonomous players in the 
international scene. Several countries like China, Russia, Africa and Japan 
have become core states.  
Unlike monoculturalists who only see the West as civilized, Huntington 
distinguishes between civilization in the singular and civilization in the plural. 
The former was created by eighteenth century thinkers as the opposite of the 
concept of “barbarism” and used to assess and “tame” non-European 
communities. This corresponded to the concept of monoculturalism. The 
                                                 
41




latter agreed that there were many civilizations and they could be termed 
civilized in their own ways 42 . This was probably the precursor to the 
multicultural movement (since a civilization is a culture writ large). 
Huntington is thus in a sense a multiculturalist since he respects the values of 
other civilizations and other cultures even though he criticizes 
multiculturalism. A monoculturalist, on the other hand, sees other cultures as 
subservient and inferior to a particular culture (typically Western culture) 
unless these cultures abandon their values and absorb the values of the 
dominant culture.  
The schism comes in the concept of a “torn” country. Though a 
“multiculturalist”, Huntington strongly objects to multiculturalists’ attempts 
to change the identity of America because it will create a torn country like 
Turkey, Australia and Mexico. Instead he proposes that Americans of all 
cultures and ethnicities should recognize America as primarily a Christian 
country, adhere to Anglo-Protestant values and maintain its English cultural 
heritage—a monoculturalist position43. There are two senses of the term “a 
torn country”. It could mean a country whose identity cannot be classified 
under any known category or a country constantly engaged in strife. Could the 
inability to clearly define a country’s identity lead to its eventual disintegration?  
Or are these two different situations? We will press the issue and examine 
whether multiculturalism is a threat to a society or whether Huntington is 
equivocating on the word “torn”. These will occupy our attention in the 
subsequent chapter.   
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Chapter 3: Development Fixity 
 
Yet the culturalist thesis is based on an undifferentiated and 
ahistorical understanding of modernity and democracy. 
Taking the late twentieth and early twenty-first century models 
of the West as the criteria against which other cultures are 
judged and found wanting, the culturalists ignore the diversity 
of the modernization process in Europe and in those non-
European countries that have made considerable headway in 
this direction.  
Shireen T. Hunter 
“Modernization and Democratization in the Muslim World” 
 
I Criticism of Huntington’s position 
Huntington’s central theme in The Clash of Civilizations is “that culture and 
cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are 
shaping patters of cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the post-Cold War 
world44”. As a justification of his argument, he claims that the Cold War 
question of “Which side are you on?” is replaced by the question of “Who are 
you?”45. Since culture is the most fundamental unit in the international scene, 
there are only two options open to all states. They can either choose to join 
their parent civilizations or straddle between two civilizations.  The normal 
course of development is to be a member state to a core civilization. According 
to Huntington, “In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are 
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blood and belief, faith and family. People rally to those with similar ancestry, 
religion, language, values and institutions and distance themselves from those 
with different ones.”46   
The alternative is to straddle between two civilizations and become a 
torn country. A torn country occurs when either the political elite or the public 
or the host civilization does not support the shift in civilization identity47. 
Turkey has become torn because it has chosen to embrace both 
Westernization and modernization. Countries like Turkey will continue to face 
identity crises until they choose to align themselves to the parent civilization 
because “efforts to shift a society from one civilization to another are 
unsuccessful”48. As cultural identities are clearly drawn and has become an 
increase source of conflicts, he predicts that “the dangerous clashes of the 
future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic 
intolerance and Sinic assertiveness”49. My thesis seeks to show that the central 
assumption of Huntington’s thesis—cultural essentialism—renders his 
analysis not merely inaccurate but also dangerous in this age of intense 
cultural conflicts. This chapter examines the claim that there is a set of values 
that persistently remains important in a civilization. I will proceed to show 
that these core beliefs (like violence and Christianity), which seem to be of 
permanent importance to a culture, can lose their significance when a new set 
of opposing values is widely accepted.  The old set of beliefs does not 
disappear but it is no longer dominant or widely practised in that society or 
culture.  
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We must start by examining the relatively uncontroversial claim that 
we are moving away from the age of political ideologies (which are distinct 
from political systems50) to the age of cultural identities. It implies that there 
is a clear and distinct difference between ideology and culture. One apparent 
difference is that ideologies are rational constructs by thinkers such as Karl 
Marx while culture seems to have a high emotional content. The second 
difference is that while ideologies are not indigenous to the country, culture 
forms an indispensable part of the lives of the people. Ideologies are thus seen 
as foreign elements that aim to suppress the indigenous culture, like how 
Communism aimed to suppress Confucianism in China. Removing these 
ideologies will lay bare the hidden nature, the untouched layers of thinking. 
These layers of thinking are cultural materials and are distinct from ideology 
because they are primordial. Primordial instincts will band people of the same 
cultural group together and push those of different cultures apart. These are 
the invisible hands in modern day cultural conflicts.   
Prima facie, it does seem that cultures are untouched by human 
reconstruction and are more instinctive and primordial but this image is false. 
Cultural values of many civilizations are usually based on certain philosophies 
and/or religions and these have as much intellectual content as Communism, 
if not more. (Conversely, it is not true that Communism is merely a rational 
system, for it too appealed to the emotions of the proletariat. Very few people 
are convinced by purely rational arguments). Volumes of theological books 
have been written to justify various religious systems and equally numerous 
philosophical writings and literature have been produced to justify and 
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perpetuate non-religious views like Confucianism and liberalism.  These 
systems influence people’s worldview, what they see as appropriate and 
inappropriate, or in short, the culture of a people. As such, the distinction 
between ideology of Communism and the cultural values of Confucianism is 
not a clear one.  In the final analysis, what separate the two are their longevity 
and the degree to which the people accept these as part of their lives. 
Ideologies that get accepted become the cultural norms or part of the 
indigenous culture. But even the idea of longevity is problematic because 
interpretations of a culture can differ radically and hence it begs the question 
of how the same set of beliefs can be transmitted from generation to 
generation without any dilution or revolution.  
When academics, politicians and terrorists start to use culture as a 
support for their missions, their interpretations of culture become ideologies. 
Osama bin Laden’s appeal to Islam, Lee Kuan Yew’s appeal to Confucianism 
and Huntington’s appeal to Anglo-Protestant values are constructed realities. 
That is not to say that there is no corresponding reality. What it means is that 
to select certain values from a body of cultural values is a political process. 
There is no given in culture. At different times, different values are 
emphasized. Lee Kuan Yew’s argument on how Confucianism is compatible 
with capitalism is probably alien to traditional Confucian scholars who 
showed great contempt for merchants.  Osama certainly thinks that he is 
reviving values that were endorsed by the Prophet and returning Islam to its 
pure and untainted version but that is a doubtful claim. This appeal to the 
pure form of a culture, the need to gain orthodoxy and to establish a link 
between the ancient past with the present all rest on the idea that there is a set 




claims. One is whether there is indeed a set of values that will remain 
important through the ages and is particular to only one civilization and two, 
whether the loss of such values, if there is any, will lead to disintegration of a 
society.  Again, it must be emphasized that we are discounting values that are 
crucial to the survival of all society.  
 
II Is There an Unchanging Essence in Culture? 
Huntington postulates that the next conflicts will be among Sinic, 
Islamic and Western civilizations but he clearly thinks that Islamic civilization 
is the greater threat to world peace. Combining independently determined 
statistics, Huntington concludes, “Muslims make up about one-fifth of the 
world’s population but in the 1990s they have been far more involved in 
intergroup violence than the people of any other civilization”.  For example, 
according to Ted Robert Gurr, Muslims were involved in 26 of 50 ethno-
political conflicts in 1993-1994. The New York Times identified Muslims as 
involved in 28 out of 59 ethnic conflicts in 1993. In another analysis, Ruth 
Leger Sivard identified 9 of 12 intercivilizational conflicts were between 
Muslims and non-Muslims51.   
Furthermore, Huntington claims that “Islam has been a religion of 
sword and it glorifies military virtues. Islam originated among ‘warring 
Bedouin nomadic tribes’ and this ‘violent origin is stamped in the foundation 
of Islam. Muhammad himself is remembered as a hard fighter and a skillful 
military commander.’… The Koran contains “few prohibitions on violence and 
a concept of non-violence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice”.52 In 
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other words, Huntington thinks that violence forms a core value in Islamic 
civilization.  
Has this always been the case? What we are asking is whether there is a 
necessary connection between Islam and violence. The burden falls on 
Huntington to show that in every manifestation of Islam, there is an 
undeniable link to brute force and failing that, his claim about the violent 
nature of Islam is merely contingent. As an example to illustrate the difference 
between necessary and contingent connections, we can consider Mill’s 
argument for liberty as the necessary condition for the growth of human 
genius.  However, as human genius can be found in severely disciplined 
communities like the military, Mill is not entitled to making such a strong 
claim. At most, the connection between liberty and human genius is empirical 
or contingent (meaning that though these two qualities are commonly found 
together in real life, it does not follow that one inevitably causes the other)53. 
An example of a statement that is necessarily true is an identity statement like 
“All bachelors are unmarried”.  In this case, being unmarried is an 
indispensable quality of a bachelor. Once married, he no longer remains a 
bachelor. This is not the case for contingent statements like Newton’s laws 
that were once believed by scientists to be universal truths. Ever since the 
appearance of the theory of relativity, Newton’s laws have been refuted.  
Though Huntington’s evidence for violence among Muslim groups is 
persuasive, there is a limit to what the statistics above can legitimately prove. 
At most, the statistics only show frequent violence in some Muslim countries 
in the late twentieth century. To generalize it to a universal claim about Islam 
seems to be a leap in reasoning. One has to imagine what it really means if 
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there is necessary connection between Islam and violence. It means that peace 
is not possible at all in any country with Muslim population, whether Muslims 
are a majority or a minority. It rules out the possibility of a long period of 
peace and harmony. However, we can find numerous exceptions. Malaysia, for 
example, has not experienced any violence between Muslims and people of 
other religions ever since the 1969 racial riot. Brunei too has been relatively 
peaceful.  
If it is proven that there is a logical connection between Islam and 
violence, then we cannot build a new world order with Islam, unlike what 
Huntington claims at the end of his book. It must be eradicated from the 
world system of beliefs. There is no possibility of negotiation because if 
violence forms an indispensable doctrine of Islam, diminishing this quality 
will diminish the essence of Islam. It is similar to saying that we must remove 
Jesus Christ from all accounts of Christianity. That will violate the very nature 
of the religion. That is reductio ad absurdum of saying that Islam is logically 
connected to violence and it is doubtful if Huntington is willing to commit to 
this conclusion.  
It may be argued that the statistics do give a true depiction of the world 
situation now and all these talks about logical and empirical connections seem 
divorced from real policy-making. I submit that the data may paint a dark but 
nonetheless an accurate picture of a segment of Muslims currently but to 
mistake the essential for the accidental will doom us to failure. If we see Islam 
as the source of problem when it is not, and build our policies around this 
false assumption, we will be solving the wrong problem.  It is the same way 
many forms of discrimination were justified. African-Americans were seen as 




were only capable of menial jobs and were not as civilized as the Americans.  
In the same way, discrimination against women was based on what seem to be 
self-evident facts—that there were few capable women in the workplace and 
giving them the power to work or to vote would be an exercise in futility. It is 
upon hindsight that we discover the reasons for their inferior positions in 
society were the lack of opportunity and was unfortunately perpetuated by 
statistics and data.   
Other than using statistics to establish a necessary connection between 
Islam and violence, Huntington also resorts to a biased and truncated history 
of the Islamic civilization, suppressing vital information which would overturn 
the argument. While the core values of Western civilization have been distilled 
from centuries of history to obtain the tradition of the rule of law and 
liberalism, Huntington only views Islam in the late twentieth century and 
equates it with violence. He obliterates Islamic achievements in science, in 
empire building and many glorious achievements at the height of Islamic 
civilization by focusing on frequent violence in certain Muslim societies. To 
have a fair comparison, he should have focused on positive and negative 
achievements of both civilizations over the same period of time.  
Indeed he only cursorily mentions the unpleasant aspect of Western 
history but dismisses it as irrelevant to the argument. “In the past Christians 
killed fellow Christians and other people in massive numbers. To evaluate the 
violence propensities of civilizations throughout history would require 
extensive research which is impossible here” 54 . One just had to ask if 
Christians were intolerant in the past. From Spanish Inquisition to the clash 
between Protestantism and Catholicism, Christians have been as guilty of 
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intolerance as Muslims of the modern era. If violence has been common in 
both civilizations, then it should not be the distinguishing feature of Islamic 
civilization. To focus on the negative aspects of Islamic civilization and claim 
these to be an indispensable part of Islam is no different from someone who 
claims that Christianity is intolerant because of its history.  
Hence a closer examination of Huntington’s most controversial claim 
that “Islam has bloody borders” suggests that he suffers from elementary flaws 
in reasoning, which is surprising for such a scholar of his standing. Such 
negative portrayal of Islam confirms Edward Said’s opinions of Orientalist 
scholars, of which Huntington is one of them—that they “have tended to use 
their standing as experts to deny—and sometimes even to cover—their deep-
seated feelings about Islam with a language of authority whose purpose is to 
certify their ‘objectivity’ and scientific impartiality” 55 A report entitled 
Modernization and Democratization in the Muslim World too notes that “a 
great many studies (on Islam) are one sided, inflammatory, and infused with 
emotions and ideological overtones.  Indeed at present, impartiality seems a 
rare commodity when discussing about Islam, and most discussions have 
become politicized and subjective.”56   
The importance of taking a long perspective in answering questions on 
cultural identity is found in Kishore Mahbubani’s Can Asians think?. His 
answer to the title of the book: it depends on the time frame.  If we view 
history from the time of the Enlightenment till the modern era, Asians have 
certainly fallen behind the West in terms of innovation and creativity. 
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However, if we stretch history to the time of Tang Dynasty and the Ottoman 
Empire, Asians were definitely far ahead than the West in many aspects. Thus 
there is no necessary connection between the inability to innovate (or other 
qualities) and a culture.57 To answer the question based on current history is 
not being objective but being myopic. 
Sociologist Aihwa Ong claims that Huntington’s taxonomy is ultimately 
based on the West and the Rest model that builds on the lack of historical 
dynamism in the East. While Europe has undergone revolutions and produced 
progressive ideas and standards, non-Western civilizations are reverting to old 
cultural values unmodified by contact with the West. These civilizations have 
incorporated technology and capitalistic system from the West but their core 
values remain un-modern and often religious58. So Huntington’s analysis is 
faulty because he has subscribed to dualistic framework that positions the 
West as sharply different from the Rest.  
If Huntington lacks evidence to prove the necessary connection 
between Islam and violence, he is equally wanting in proof for saying that for 
any civilization, ‘“the unique and particular essence’ is ‘their long historical 
continuity’” 59 . Huntington notes that Catholicism and Protestantism, 
separation of spiritual and temporal authority, social pluralism and rule of law 
are values central to the Western world60. For Huntington’s claims to be true, 
it is not enough to show that these beliefs exist in the society but that they are 
the values, norms and modes of thinking that successive generations attach 
primary importance. This claim will be hard to maintain if we trace the history 
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of legal and religious development in the West. Let us first focus on the 
concept of the rule of law. An important concept of the rule of law is the 
independence of the judiciary (Note that I am addressing the rule of law as a 
cultural concept, not as part of a legal system). Until that concept is developed, 
the West cannot really be said to possess the rule of law. This is a position 
endorsed by several legal philosophers like Joseph Raz, Lon Fuller and C. L. 
Ten. Ten captures it well: “If any of the principles is completely violated, then 
we do not have a legal system at all, not even a bad legal system.” 61 The 
Romans, though were originator of the legal system, did not have the 
independence of the judiciary because the emperor was above the law. Even 
after Magna Carta, the monarchy still exercised much power over other 
branches of government and interfered constantly with judgements. In the 
American Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson points out that 
King George III “made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of 
their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries”. So it is safe to 
claim that Britain had not witnessed the independence of judiciary even then. 
And this fact could probably be extended to other European nations as well.   
It was probably not until the nineteenth century that a few European countries 
started to exercise the independence of the judiciary. Huntington claims that 
though the rule of law was breached in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
the idea of the subordination of human power to some external restraint 
persisted in the West62.  But that is merely a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the existence of a legal system. Furthermore, the idea that the 
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sovereign must be subjected to external restraint was not alien to other 
cultures. 
To claim that Europe has been exercising the rule of law ever since the 
Romans is to relax the criteria and recognise that other civilizations like China 
and Islam had proper legal systems.  Certainly documents have shown that the 
Sinic and Islamic civilizations had extensive laws to govern over the land but 
often the independence of the judiciary was not guaranteed. And if the 
independence of the judiciary were to take place, it would be a revolution, a 
complete change of the foundation of the political system. The move to curb 
the unlimited power of the sovereign was not a peaceful development but a 
long struggle of ideas.  For in the pre-legal world, the sovereign could interfere 
with judgements and with it came the instability of laws. When judges can be 
truly independent, people are more certain about how the court will judge and 
look to the judges as the final arbiters in case of dispute.  
It is thus inaccurate to say that there is a continuity of central values 
between revolutions because each age is in fact a rebellion against the former.  
This does not necessarily mean bloodshed but it does mean that there is a 
struggle for power and supremacy. I do not rule out a peaceful transition to a 
new regime or a new set of beliefs but even in a peaceful transition, there is a 
new perspective and a new mode of thinking that will replace the old order in 
dominance and popularity. The development of Christianity will make it clear. 
Huntington writes that Europe has a history of Catholicism and Protestantism, 
ignoring the tumultuous Reformation that has separated the two branches of 
Christianity. It caused re-alignments and numerous religious conflicts 
between countries.  Before the Reformation, the Pope was indisputably the 




Protestantism, his power waned and with it came a fundamental re-
orientation of power of balance between the states.  With subsequent 
developments like the French Revolution and the separation of state and 
church, the status of Catholicism is no longer as esteemed as it was in the past.  
With respect to the Christian foundation of Western civilization, while 
it is true that many are still churchgoers, it is not a contradiction to claim that 
Europe and America have become more and more secular. Princeton, Harvard, 
Cambridge and Oxford were once set up to train ministers but their religious 
foundations have mostly been forgotten. Where intelligentsia were largely 
composed of fervent Christians like Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Faraday, Bach, 
Chesterton, atheism and anti-Christian beliefs have become prevalent among 
the literati. In France, the separation between Church and state has reached a 
level in which the crucifixes are not allowed in classrooms. The refusal of the 
European Union to affirm Christianity as their common heritage is a public 
declaration of the breach between Europe’s Christian past and its secular 
beliefs. Newsweek Editor Fareed Zakaria concludes, “Religion in the Western 
World is now a source of spiritual inspiration and not a template for day-to-
day living. The Bible still condemns masturbation, usury, and the weaving of 
woven cloth; Christian societies just no longer see it as an authority on these 
matters”.63  Thus, this reinforces my point that it is not sufficient to show that 
the same beliefs still exist in the society, it must be shown that the beliefs 
occupy the same importance and prestige that it did in the past, a task that 
Huntington has not undertaken.  
Even restricting ourselves to the Anglo-Protestant culture in America, 
which is a continuum for Huntington, there is a great rift in the underlying 
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beliefs of the Puritans and modern Americans. Many modern Americans 
believe that human history begins with primitive cavemen progressing and 
developing modern civilization and will continue till life disappears from this 
earth. In the seventeenth century, the image of history was radically different. 
Constructed from Jewish folk-lore and Hellenistic mysticism, history began 
with God’s creation of the world and centred around the revolt of non-
believers against God, cumulating in the final judgment.  The faithful would be 
re-united with God and continue the life of worship while the villains would be 
eternally damned64.  
As can be seen, because of common history and metaphysics, the 
Puritans did not have to justify the existence of God or have the culture of 
disbelief. Huntington is right that deep religiosity is an American tradition65 
but he has failed to mention that the role of religion has been banished to the 
private realm. The failure to recognise that a change in worldview signals a 
cultural revolution leads to Huntington’s insistence on long historical 
continuity. Certainly, practices like celebration of religious festivals and high 
church attendance still persist but these should not be mistaken for continuity 
in worldview, history and the role of the religion. As a culture is defined as 
“values, norms, institutions and modes of thinking to which successive 
generations in a given society attached primary importance”, changes in one’s 
worldview will result in changes in one’s cultural assumptions. While the 
Genesis account of creation was seen as true by majority of the people, it has 
now been replaced by theory of evolution and taught in many schools.  There 
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are schools that teach the Genesis account of creation but these belong to the 
minority.  
From all the illustrations given, it is not sufficient to show that the 
beliefs or doctrines are present in the culture.  This is only true if the tradition 
is the only one that exists in that culture, then its mere presence would 
indicate its importance. However a culture co-exists with other cultures and it 
is important to note whether the culture is importantly present—it is “present 
in such a way that significantly qualifies, defines, or otherwise shapes the 
culture.”66 One important indicator is whether the culture is widely practised 
by people in the society.  
Thus, I have shown that if we adhere to Huntington’s definition of 
culture as values and norms that successive generations attach primary 
importance, it is hard to prove that the same culture is as important to the 
new generation as it was to the previous generations. In fact, the burden of 
proof falls on cultural essentialists like Huntington to show that this is the 
case. Given the 75-year average life span of a human being, how can we say 
with confidence that our ancestors actually believe in the same set of core 
values as we do? If we cannot be certain over the continuity of values within a 
few generations, how can we certain of continuity of values over a millennium 
or more? Clearly, Huntington is making a big assumption without sufficient 
evidence. Humans generally have a short-term memory and with events to 
constantly reconfigure their arrangement of history and importance of values, 
it is hard to maintain that the same set of core beliefs persists within the 
civilization throughout its entire existence.   
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Furthermore, humans have the ability to reorganize and reprioritize the 
existing order of values.  In the cultural essentialist framework, it seems that 
individuals are merely following the core values as laid down by their 
forefathers and they lack the creativity and ingenuity to renew or replace these 
values.  This is far from true as shown in the previous examples.  Values seen 
as vital to the previous generation may seem less important to the younger 
generation.  Thus, those who have witnessed World War II would find that the 
younger generation usually takes peace and comfort for granted. Even within 
the context of a family, we know that despite constant reinforcement, the 
children may not adopt the same viewpoints and values as the parents.  Hence 
Huntington’s account of human behaviour should take into account not just 
the habit of obedience but also the ability to reflect on the existing order and 
reorganize it.  
However, because of historical amnesia, the ability to reorganize 
historical information can also suffer from certain imbalances. Each age often 
writes history from the present viewpoint and views the previous age with 
certain prejudices and biases. For example, the term “Dark Ages” reflects the 
biases of the Renaissance who saw the Medieval times as a time of intellectual 
stagnation. In fact, the Middle Age was a time when universities and scientific 
research flourished and when there was a lot of intellectual exchanges among 
civilizations.  Even though there are practices which seem to continue from 
one age to another, it would not be accurate to say that there is continuity in 
mode of thinking and values. According to Medieval professor C. S. Lewis, 
their metaphysical world was “a syncretistic model constructed not only out of 
Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoical, but also out of Pagan and Christian elements” 




century”67,  hence the title of his work, The Discarded Image.  Thus we cannot 
be certain that many of our historical depictions are not similarly freed from 
such biases, which both minimize changes in worldviews and suppress 
important information about the past.  Similarly, Huntington too suffers such 
biases when writing about the Islamic civilization.  
Nonetheless, critics will still insist that there are some essences in 
cultures despite going through revolutions. They often appeal to examples 
from religions. Despite the split into Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodox 
Christianity, these three versions still possess certain essences. Despite the 
split into Sunni and Shite Muslims, Muslims too affirm certain doctrines. It is 
at this point we must distinguish between the religious institution and popular 
conception of religious beliefs, though both are parts of a culture. Two 
examples will illustrate the difference. One is the way Christmas is 
increasingly celebrated in the West. Within the popular culture of secularism, 
the religious undertone of the festival is underplayed and replaced with 
commercialism and Santa Claus. However, in the formal religious setting (the 
church) which is a sub-culture, the religious message is taken to be the core 
message. Second, popular texts like The Da Vinci Code and movies like The 
Temptation of Christ challenge the divinity of Christ but are vehemently 
opposed by the churches. Huntington has equated Christianity with the West 
and Islam with the Middle East but that is false. A religion is more defined in 
structure and usually has at least one sacred text and certain recognised 
religious authority. Popular culture is more diffused and does not have to be 
based on a sacred text. The divinity of Christ is essential to Christianity: 
remove Jesus Christ, his divinity and the Bible from the equation and we have 
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created a new religion. Similarly, Allah and Prophet Muhammad are essential 
to the practice of Islam: remove these two figures from Islam and we have 
destroyed its essence.  
But popular culture can abandon its religious beliefs. The dominant 
culture is based on popular consensus and hence is not restricted in following 
certain cultural paths. It is not logically impossible to conceive the West as 
separate from Christianity and indeed that is what is happening now. Europe 
has to grapple with the increasing influx of Muslims in its population and in 
time to come, there will be a new cultural hybrid.  That the West has been 
greatly influenced by Christianity is an undeniable fact but history and 
tradition cannot force the West to continue on this path. To do so is a 
conscious choice made by leaders and the general population.  Turkey, Syria 
and Damascus were once important Christian states but they were converted 
to Islam by conquest and by persuasion.  Similarly, it is no logical 
contradiction to envisage an India that does not subscribe to Hinduism. It will 
be a different India but it will not be an impossible scenario. Malaysia and 
Indonesia were once Hindu nations but Islam has replaced the official religion. 
To see a religious institution as distinct from the popular conception of 
religious beliefs will go a long way to dispel the myth of an inevitable clash 
between civilizations. Both are parts of a culture but a religious institution 
tends to be orthodox while popular culture tends to less constraint in its 
interpretation of religious texts. While popular culture maybe a product of the 
religion, its subsequent development may deviate greatly from the command 
of the Holy Scriptures. In a religion, the interpreters are the assigned spiritual 
authority, which would be the Pope in the Catholic tradition, the ulamas in 




scriptures and hence, any large deviation from the scripture may void their 
authorities. However, a culture which originated from a religion may not have 
such restriction. This is especially true for a non-theocratic or secular state. Its 
interpreters are many and diverse. They could include politicians, literati and 
even ordinary individuals.  Though they may interpret according to the Holy 
Book, there is less restrictions upon their interpretations.  
Secondly, within the religion, there is power to excommunicate 
members whose doctrinal beliefs do not align with those with the spiritual 
authority. However, in a culture based on a religion, there is no central 
authority to decide on the orthodox interpretation.  
 Religions are the clearest when it comes to moral issues like murder, 
abortion and sexual orientation but when devout followers, even the most 
sincere ones, try to extrapolate religion to political matters, which are 
ambiguities in the sacred books, then all sorts of calamity occur. To blame 
Christianity for the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, colonialism and slavery, 
would be unfair to the religion even though their proponents had justified 
their acts in the name of God. In modern days, Christians too champion issues 
that seem to have tenuous links with the religion. For example, the President 
of the National Association of Evangelicals once included “Repeal of the 
capital gains tax” as one of the top ten concerns. Other dubious issues 
advocated by other Christians include abolishing the Department of Education, 
the NAFTA trade agreements and the Panama Canal treaty68. If abuses of 
Christianity had been common episodes in the West, we should be charitable 
and see Islam as distinct from the Middle East culture.   Osama may sincerely 
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see his war as a fight for God but should we use his version of Islam as a good 
gauge of what Islam really stands for?     
A further distinction must be made between religious differences and 
intolerance. Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam possess 
incommensurable and incompatible claims about the identity of God and the 
issue of salvation but that should not automatically lead to any sort of riots or 
violence. It is intolerance—the belief that there is one truth and all other ways 
of life are wrong—that ultimately leads to violence. Even pious worshippers 
have to admit that other religions do contain certain true moral principles—
like loving one another, honesty and unselfishness although they disagree 
vehemently about doctrines. They do not have to think that all other religions 
are one big mistake. If there is only one true vision of the good life, then the 
remaining tasks are to persuade or coerce others to the same opinion. But if it 
is not so, the path is open to pluralism, toleration and compromise. As Berlin 
concludes, “Toleration is historically the product of the realisation of the 
irreconcilability of equally dogmatic faiths, and the practical improbability of 
complete victory of one over the other”. Being aware that there is no one 
definitive solution to human affairs will help others appreciate diversity as a 
fundamental fact of life. 69  
 
III Losing One’s Cultural Core 
Another implication of a necessary connection between a civilization 
and certain core values is that the loss of such indispensable values will lead to 
the destruction of the civilization. In a chapter in The Clash of Civilizations, 
Huntington warns America not to lose its cultural core—its Protestant ethics 
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and heritage of the Western civilization. Multiculturalists, on the other hand, 
wish to reject the country’s heritage and identify America with another 
civilization, thereby creating a country of many civilizations, that is, a country 
without a cultural core but that kind of society cannot survive long70. The 
underlying assumption is that cultures cannot be integrated and the 
possibility of shifting allegiances is excluded from Huntington’s account. To 
him, a state must belong to its distinct civilization or it will suffer from 
identity crisis and become torn countries like Russia and Mexico or cleft 
countries like Czechoslovakia. 
His recent work Who are We? is noteworthy for he is applying a similar 
argument to immigration policy. This book elaborates on what Huntington 
sees as the core of Western civilization—the Anglo-Protestant culture and how 
its possible destruction by multiculturalism and the influx of immigrants will 
radically transform America for the worse. Huntington is not averse to 
changes. He speaks of changes to the national culture over time. Right after 
independence, Americans were defined by race, ethnicity, culture and religion.  
These four components were part of the American identity until the World 
War II when the large number of immigrants drove out the outdated concept 
of ethnicity. The Civil Rights movement also blurred the racial factor. Thus, by 
the 1970s, Americans were defined in terms of culture and the Creed71.  
With the rise of multiculturalism, Huntington fears the eventual 
demise of the Anglo-Protestant culture that is so indispensable to American 
identity. He envisages four possible scenarios. One, America could lose its 
core culture and become multicultural. Despite this, America can still be 
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committed to the principles of the Creed, enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence, which would provide the basis for national unity and identity.72 
However, according to Huntington, America with only the Creed as the basis 
for unity would soon evolve into a loose confederation of groups. And as the 
America in the 1780s and Germany in the 1860s suggest, past confederations 
have not lasted long73. 
Two, Huntington warns of the possibility that various forces from 
minority groups may propel native white Americans to revive racism and 
ethnocentrism that exclude, expel or suppress people of other racial, ethnic 
and religious groups. History has shown that violence can occur if a once 
dominant group feels threatened by the rise of other groups. “It could produce 
a racially intolerant country with high levels of inter-group conflict”74. 
Third is that America will become a bicultural country.  As he 
emphatically asks, “Would America be the America it is today if in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it had been settled not by British 
Protestants but by French, Spanish, or Portuguese Catholics? The answer is no. 
It would not be America; it would be Quebec, Mexico, or Brazil”75. He attacks 
the goals of Hispanic leaders to prevent the assimilation of Hispanics into 
America’s Anglo-Protestant society (even though many Hispanics are 
Christians) and transform America into a bilingual and bicultural society and 
not the 300-year-old model of an Anglo-Protestant core with ethnic 
subcultures76.  
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The final scenario is the most optimistic of all the situations. It is for 
Americans of all races and ethnicities to commit to the core culture of Anglo-
Protestant values, maintain its English heritage and preserve America as 
primarily a Christian nation77.  
Like in much of his writing, Huntington has marshalled numerous 
comments and data from various experts to buttress his case, but again we 
must be careful not to make necessary statements based on limited data. Thus 
Huntington has to prove that Anglo-Protestant culture is not merely central, 
which is a less disputed fact, but indispensable and essential to the American 
culture and the Western civilization. If one searches deeper behind 
Huntington’s arguments for preservation of the dominance of the Anglo-
Protestant culture, one will find that he veers towards emotional rhetoric, 
rather than well-reasoned arguments. In establishing his case, he often 
appeals to history, the disintegration thesis and the conservative thesis.  
Philosopher of law Hart first coined the disintegration and conservative theses 
to rebut Lord Devlin’s argument for the public enforcement of morality. 
Though the context was different, the arguments are pertinent. We will 
consider each in turn.  
One of the most important reasons for maintaining the core Protestant 
culture is that this has been the way of life for the past three hundred years 
and Huntington lists out a number of ways in which America is different from 
others in terms of religious conviction, the influence of religion on politics, etc. 
So much is obvious. But it does not follow that this way of life must be 
preserved or given special priority over other visions of the good life just 
because it enjoys the status of an incumbent. For Huntington’s case to be 
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convincing, he has to show that other cultures pose a threat to the stability 
and security of the society, not just because the culture is unique. This appeal 
to the old way of life, which spans over a few chapters, is not grounded in solid 
logic. It is not sufficient to appeal to history just as it is not sufficient to justify 
slavery based on past practices.  
The history as given by Huntington is only a particular account and a 
dominant narrative for that matter. However, as I have mentioned in the 
previous chapter, multicultural history involves a re-assessment of the roles of 
other cultural groups that has been buried under years of official history.  This 
is part of the fair terms of integration for minority groups. Deciding on a 
particular account of history is a political choice and treating it as politically 
neutral process ignores many problems about accuracy, objectivity, justice 
and fairness. The lack of objectivity in Japan’s history textbooks, for example, 
which very briefly mention the Nanking massacres and the brutal treatment of 
the POWs, is one of the ongoing disputes between Japan and its neighbours.  
The second strategy Huntington uses is the disintegration thesis. There 
are two senses of the word “disintegration”.  The first is the uninteresting 
thesis of identifying a society with specific cultural traits such that any change 
will make this society “disintegrate” by definition 78 . This sense of 
disintegration merely means the disappearance of certain cultural values that 
do not bring about any concrete social ills or decrease in the quality of life. It is 
a mere verbal dispute. In a sense, Huntington sees the American society 
disintegrate when Anglo-Protestant culture is replaced by multiculturalism. 
He has a certain conception of multiculturalism—as a loose collection of 
cultures without a cultural core. Certainly this is false.  Different cultures have 
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agreement over certain universal values like trust and the condemnation of 
random violence and these will be the foundation on which subsequent 
interactions are built on. Furthermore, it is doubtful that these universal 
values are the only commonality between them and they probably share 
certain agreement over sexual morality, marriage and protection of property. 
Multicultural societies like Switzerland, Singapore and Belgium have 
weathered through crisis after crisis and continued to grow and prosper, 
which would not have been possible if there is no culture to hold them 
together.  As a multicultural society matures, its people will gather enough 
common experiences, common worldviews and common history to see 
themselves as an imagined community. To equate multiculturalism with a 
void, a mixture of culture without cohesiveness is inaccurate. It is wrong to 
compare a multicultural society with failed confederations like Germany in the 
1860s because what led to the breakdown was primarily the failure in the 
political system, much like the chaos in Yugoslavia. 
This sense of disintegration is implicit in Huntington’s use of word 
“torn country” with reference to Turkey, Mexico and Australia. They are torn 
because they are unsuccessful in the process of identity redefinition but they 
still remain politically and socially stable. While it is no doubt that these 
countries may be suffering from an identity problem, it is not clear that the 
process of identity redefinition cannot be successful. We have seen how the 
Hindu nations of Indonesia and Malaysia successfully converted to Islam. 
Given the fact that Turkey has been accepted into various European 
organizations like NATO, it should be a matter of years before Turkey’s 
admission into the European Union becomes a reality. Already, respected 




political leaders are lobbying for Turkey’s case.  While cultural prejudices are 
real, they should not form a permanent hindrance to Turkey’s EU membership. 
I thus see an identity crisis as a passing phase that can be overcome with 
determination from political leaders.   
There are many countries, especially multicultural countries that have 
to face the issue of fluid identity and it is not a problem peculiar to the three 
countries mentioned. By labeling Mexico, Australia and Turkey as torn 
countries, Huntington seems to ignore that the same problem is faced by other 
countries. It is by no means clear that the public and the ruling elite always 
have general consensus on national identities. In that case, the concept of a 
torn country is descriptively useless because it does not describe a unique 
problem. In fact, it obscures the fact that cultural identities are not static. The 
search for identity in developed and developing countries around the world is 
precisely because identity is malleable to changes in the global and immediate 
environments, a fact Huntington seems to miss when he writes: 
 
The Japanese agonize over whether their location, history, and 
culture make them Asian or whether their wealth, democracy 
and modernity make them Western. Iran has been described as 
“a nation in search of an identity,” South Africa as engaged in the 
search for identity,” while Taiwan was involved in the 
“dissolution and reconstruction of national identity.” Syria and 
Brazil are each to face an “identity crisis”, Canada “a continuing 




“destructive identity crisis”, Turkey a “unique identity crisis” 
leading to heated “debate on national identity.”79  
 
The other more important sense of disintegration is a possible increase 
in crime rate, racial tension and elements of subversions. Huntington thinks 
that the introduction of other cultures will cause a decline in American culture, 
a decline in morality. Definitely, if the Anglo-Protestant culture is replaced by 
a culture that emphasizes violence, the breaking of law, gangsterism and other 
undesirable features, one has a good case to discontinue the influence of these 
cultures. But are many Hispanics violent thugs who are bent on vandalism, 
crime and social unrest? This is an empirical claim that is hard to verify and 
the reason for Huntington’s pessimistic outlook is primarily that Hispanics 
have a different culture, and not necessarily morally bad values.  
Furthermore the existence of two dominant cultures does not 
necessarily bring about cultural or racial riots.   This fact is rest on the 
mistaken assumption of cultural essentialism, where two cultures will collide 
by virtue of the fact that they possess different essences. Such a view 
diminishes the role of individuals in creating and mediating conflicts. As I 
shall argue in detail in Chapter 5, conflicts do not just happen. It is 
unscrupulous leaders who exaggerate threats from other cultures that spark 
off violence and hatred. Or conflicts can occur when they devise unwise 
policies that suppress minority groups. A cleft country like Sri Lanka is born 
because “a majority group belonging to one civilization attempts to define the 
state as its political instrument and to make its language, religion, and 
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symbols those of the state”80. Interestingly, this seems to be what Huntington 
is advocating—continuing the tradition of the Anglo-Protestant culture despite 
different beliefs among its minorities. 
The foregoing paragraphs have shown the shortcomings of the 
disintegration thesis. We shall now focus on the conservative thesis. 
Conservative thesis is the thesis that certain features make an organization, a 
culture or a community unique and thus should be preserved. This seems to 
be part of Huntington’s argument when he says that if the British had not 
settled in America, “It would not be America; it would be Quebec, Mexico, or 
Brazil” or the fact that a bifurcated America with bilingualism will be a 
fundamentally different America from the past.  However the same argument 
has been used by Hitler and in the apartheid to justify the exclusion of other 
races81.  There is no guarantee that the preservation of dominant culture in 
America will not lead to the same situation in Nazi Germany and Apartheid 
Africa.  
Again, we must distinguish between attacks from a subversive group 
like the Al-Qaeda from the perceived threat of “invasion of a foreign culture”. 
Definitely we should protect our homeland from attacks by malicious forces 
but to associate migrants with foreigners with ill intent is a policy on the 
wrong foot.  Huntington seems to connote such effect when he writes, “All 
societies face recurring threats to their existence, to which they eventually 
succumb. Yet some societies, even when so threatened, are capable of 
postponing their demise by halting and reversing the processes of decline and 
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renewing their vitality and identity.”82 He talks also of “invasion by barbarian 
invaders” from another powerful civilization when the civilization no longer 
chooses to defend itself.83 
To preserve the dominant culture, Huntington harks back to the days 
when migrants willingly gave up their cultural practices and adopt the local 
ones. But Huntington’s policy of forced assimilation is illiberal. While majority 
of Americans may support an Anglo-Protestant culture, it violates the Creed to 
use majority force to pressure the minority into conformity. One may have 
good reasons to preserve a culture, but they can never be based on injustice 
and illiberal principles. Otherwise, it is merely a conservation of certain traits 
and the foregoing of important principles.  Fighting against the tyranny of 
customs and culture is one tenet of liberalism. In a society where might is 
right, only the strong can succeed and it is doubtful that is what the Founding 
Fathers had envisioned America to be.  
In fact, illiberal policies will actually push minority groups to be less 
integrated with the dominant group, as shown in the example of Sri Lanka. 
Making the process of immigration easier is not sufficient to integrate the 
minority group with the mainstream. The combination of policies, human 
rights, education, anti-discrimination laws, health and safety, are the major 
engines of integration, not just immigration policies84.  America has been able 
to attract numerous immigrants who slowly claim themselves to be Americans 
because of fair and just policies.  The rising tension among migrants, 
especially Muslims, in the post-Sept 11 America is because of discriminatory 
policies and xenophobia.   
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As Will Kymlicka argues, there must be fair terms of integration for 
immigrants.  Immigrants should be given the right to determine their 
language use, their way of life and so on within reasonable limits. The mere 
usage of one’s mother tongue, having an education of one’s own heritage will 
not create a separate nation unless the minority can take over the rein of 
political power. As a hypothetical situation, he asks readers to imagine what it 
takes for Chinese to become a national minority and acquire self-governing 
powers like what English colonists throughout the British Empire did. It 
would require a spectrum of Chinese schools—from primary schools to 
universities, a political party where Chinese is the majority, the use of Chinese 
as the official language in workplace and on official occasions, and a policy to 
naturalise future immigrants to Chinese culture. That multiculturalism, as 
practiced in numerous countries, has not created such national minorities 
should not create duress for those who are in power85.  
This chapter has shown that there are no traits, concepts and practices 
that will constantly be of primary importance to a culture or a civilization. 
There are no central values, whether negative or positive ones, which cannot 
be changed in its esteemed position over time. Samuel Huntington draws 
widespread criticism over his comment that “Islam has bloody boundaries” 
and rightly so for he bases his opinion on the situations in selected Muslim 
nations in the late twentieth century. Islam has not always been like that. As 
one of the most flourishing civilizations in the world, Islam was able to bring 
about a scientific and cultural revolution to the Western world in the Middle 
Ages.   Similarly, the loss of Anglo-Protestant values and transformation by 
multiculturalism does not necessarily mean that America will experience an 
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increase in crime rates, violence and intolerance. Good values like harmony 
and peace too exist in other cultures and it is likely that other cultures will 



























Chapter 4: Cultural Homogeneity  
 
Yet most Western political theorists have operated within an 
idealized model of the polis in which fellow citizens share a 
common descent, language, and culture. Even when theorists 
themselves lived in polyglot empires that governed numerous 
ethnic and linguistic groups, they have often written as if the 
culturally homogeneous city-states of Ancient Greece provided 
the essential or standard model of a political community.  
Will Kymlicka 
Multicultural Citizenship  
 
I Diasporas 
In the previous chapter, I have shown that a set of values does not always 
maintain its core status within a civilization. Whatever statistics have shown is 
merely a contingent relationship. Thus to retain a core culture at the expense 
of other cultures is merely resorting to disintegration and conservative theses, 
both of which have been shown to be ungrounded.  This chapter is concerned 
with whether a culture can retain its core values when it is transported to 
another place and starts by looking at the situation at the micro level—do 
diasporas still remain committed to their parent states even after subsequent 
generations? 
The discussion will be enlarged to consider if there is a core state that 
commands the allegiance of those who are of the same cultural descent but 
relocated to another country.  I question the very idea of a political structure 




countries, and torn countries”86.  It adumbrates that there is clear line of 
command in terms of cultural values. However I will argue that a cultural 
“system” is necessary diffused with no final arbiter to settle disputes in 
interpretations and no agent to ensure conformity to values.   
 Huntington makes a distinction between immigrant population and 
settlers. Huntington thinks that earlier Americans were considered settlers 
and not immigrants since they intended to stay in America for the long term. 
Settlers are those who are committed to a new country, with no intention of 
leaving for their land of origin. Thus the founding fathers and pilgrims who 
came to America were committed to this homeland. The term “immigrant” 
was used to distinguish current arrivals from settlers of the 1780s87 . In 
contrast, present day immigrants do not display the same kind of commitment 
and loyalty as these pioneers. He criticizes Hispanic immigrants for the lack of 
loyalty because they practice dual citizenship, travel frequently back to their 
homelands. He also cites examples of diasporas who are spies or make large 
contribution to the politics and economics of their home states. Huntington 
takes the Jewish community as an archetype of the diasporadic community 
and extends the definition to other migrant groups88.  
Huntington doubts the loyalty and commitment of these diasporadic 
communities. Borrowing from the classic example of the Jewish diaspora, 
Huntington quotes the American Jewish Committee, “Although 
geographically dispersed and ideologically diverse, Jews are indeed one people, 
united by history, covenant, and culture. Together we must act to shape the 
Jewish destiny; let no one, in Israel, America or elsewhere, erect barriers 
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among us”. To Huntington, diasporas have one transnational identity, which 
is often their larger cultural identity and this will prevent them from 
displaying political loyalty.  The central focus of diasporas is their homeland 
state and the lack of which will prompt effort to create one like in the cases of 
the Irish, the Jews, the Palestinians, and the Chechens89. 
William Safran provides a more comprehensive analysis of a diaspora 
in his article “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myth of Homeland and Return”. 
He defines it as follows: “Expatriate minority communities (1) that are 
dispersed from a “centre” to at least two “peripheral” places; (2) that 
maintains a “memory, vision, or myth” about their homeland; (3) that “believe 
they are not—and perhaps cannot be—be fully accepted by their host country”; 
(4) that sees the ancestral homeland as the eventual place of return; (5) that 
are committed to the restoration of the homeland and (6) whose 
consciousness and solidarity as a group are “importantly defined” by this 
continuous relationship with the homeland”.90 Thus there must be primarily a 
commitment to one’s homeland and a belief that their present country of 
residence is a temporary one.   
From Safran’s definition, it is not difficult to see why diasporas’ 
political loyalty to the country of residence may be questionable. Essentialism 
is again at work here. From a specific case of the Jewish diaspora, its features 
are generalised to other groups of diasporadic communities. It is the vision to 
see all similar phenomena being boxed into a category and ignoring the 
fundamental differences that produce the distortion. The notion is simplified 
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to produce a homogeneous experience. There is a persistent belief that these 
migrants are merely treating the host country as a temporary place of 
residence while they remain committed to going back to their homeland. 
While Huntington may be partially right about the Jewish diaspora, there are 
important exceptions. Numerous Jews like Madeline Albright, Albert Einstein 
and George Soros have adopted America as their homeland.  
Furthermore, we should not neglect condition (3) as mentioned by 
Safran. This raises interesting questions about cause and effect. Will diasporas 
remain committed to their homeland if they are accepted by the host country? 
If we consider the case of early migrant settlers, what propelled them to move 
to the New World was the lack of acceptance in their own homeland.  
Subsequently they were able to create the social and political systems and 
institutions that supported their beliefs. But for minority groups who have 
moved to a place with existing political and social structures, they do not enjoy 
such luxury. As mentioned by Kymlicka, unfair terms of integration may cause 
migrant communities to be more isolated from the rest of society. May it not 
be possible that repeated persecution and long history of anti-Semitic 
movements had caused the Jews to harbour a hope to return to their 
homeland in Israel? This fact cannot be ignored for the Jews had faced fierce 
persecution since the Middle Ages in whatever locales they were stationed. 
The Holocaust was the most obvious manifestation of this detest of their 
presence.   
In any case, to generalize the Jewish experience to the Hispanic 
community is built on inconclusive evidence. Kymlicka notes that the label of 
Hispanics is too over-generalized a category. Distinctions must be made 




Chinanos and Spanish-speaking immigrants from Latin America. And a finer 
distinction must be made within the group of immigrants—the Cuban refugees 
and illegal Mexican immigrants. The Cuban refugees do not have impetus to 
integrate with the larger society because they saw their return to Cuba was 
imminent and this impression was reinforced by the American government, 
leading to the lack of assimilation. Illegal immigrants are on the other hand, 
not committed to America because their legal status is uncertain. But 
discounting these groups, statistics have shown that Hispanics are willing to 
assimilate and learn English91.  
Individuals are free to shift their national identities and often, political 
forces can prove effective in shifting deep rooted feelings. While it is true that 
the political system is different from culture in the sense that the former is 
more structured and organized, political leadership can help create a new set 
of norms, values and modes of thinking among its people. Singapore and 
Malaysia are migrant countries and it is true that when early Chinese migrants 
came, many had the intention of going back to their homeland. But nowadays 
many Chinese in these two countries do not regard China as their eventual 
place of return. Even Malaysian Chinese who face discrimination at home do 
not opt to return to China, though they may consider migrating to other places 
like Singapore and Australia. If the host countries do not provide an accepting 
and comfortable environment, the migrants may consider migrating to other 
places or they may persist in their enclaves. Thus the onus is on the host 
country to mint comprehensive policies to integrate the migrants into the 
country. 
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Historian Fujio Hara provides an important descriptive history of how 
migrant Chinese finally shifted their allegiance to the adopted homeland and 
how government actions and policies orchestrated the changes. Migrant 
Chinese who went to Malaya in the early twentieth century saw Malaya as a 
temporary place of residence and were very concerned with China’s internal 
affairs, which meant support for either Kuomintang or Chinese Communist 
Party. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) saw China as the homeland and 
was actively involved in supporting the CCP’s efforts in China. This went on 
during the first few years following the end of World War II92.    
The changes to migrant Chinese’s consciousness came in the late 1950s. 
The Malayan Chinese farmers who formed one of the main bases of support 
for the MCP became aware of the importance of securing land rights and 
earning a livelihood in Malaya, began to lose interest in China’s politics. Once 
MCP was outlawed by the British, it lost its ability to play an active role in 
protecting the civil rights of the local Chinese. The Chinese consulates were 
similarly unhelpful. In the end, it was the Malayan Chinese Association that 
was most effective in solving the local problems and helped create a Malayan 
identity consciousness within the local Chinese community93.  
Other indicators of the change in identity came when in October 1949, 
Nanyang Siang Pau, the largest local Chinese daily, abandoned the calendar 
system used by the Republic of China to follow the Western calendar format. 
And in the most significant shifts, Nanyang Siang Pau referred to Malaysia 
and not China as our country in 195794. Singapore began sending Chinese 
athletes to the Olympic games in 1952 and Federation of Malaya followed suit 
                                                 








in 1956. By mid-1950s textbooks had been completely Malayanized. Many 
CCP-inclined teachers, who had inspired the Chinese youth of Malaya through 
a curriculum based on loyalty toward China returned to their homeland. The 
process of conversion had been full of angst and the switch in consciousness 
was not an automatic event but a series of concerted efforts, including policy 
changes and a supportive environment95.  
As can be seen, the assimilation of migrants to the local culture is not 
about the total abandonment of one’s cultural practices. One should not judge 
the success of the assimilation process by focusing on one aspect of the 
process—whether people are still holding on to their language, festivals and 
customs but should see that minorities can remain loyal despite holding on to 
their cultural identities. It is the failure to see that cultural identities are not in 
conflict with national identity that has led to illiberal policies. For example, 
during former president Suharto’s reign, Indonesian Chinese were denied 
indigenous education, the right to celebrate Chinese festivals and to hold 
official Chinese names and such discriminatory practices sowed the seed for 
frequent violence against the Chinese community.  
However, the persistence in seeing overseas Chinese as part of the 
Greater China is still there, even among the Chinese. Yazou Zhoukan, the 
international magazine, has consciously or sub-consciously portrayed the 
Chinese everywhere as if they are one people. This is the belief Chinese 
everywhere form a “race” and possess a united transnational Chinese identity. 
For example, the achievements of a person of Chinese descent like tennis star 
                                                 
95




Michael Chang are seen as the achievements of the Chinese96. In numerous 
Western media, this image of overseas Chinese as belonging to the 
transnational race is prevalent. The Economist, in an article “Overseas 
Chinese: A Driving Force” for example, implies that overseas Chinese will 
serve China’s interest when it says the “55 million overseas Chinese will 
become greater as they pull forward China itself” and build a “transnational 
Chinese economy” that will rival Japan97.    
Furthermore, the mention of diasporas implies that the world consists 
of large groups of people who are ill-intent to spread control over other lands. 
Unscrupulous politicians have used the description to construct the image of a 
yellow peril. In countries that have large Chinese minorities, the use of the 
term “overseas Chinese” has been a major source of suspicion that the Chinese 
can never been loyal to their host country. Some go as far as hypothesizing 
that China is behind the Chinese dispersion, sending out people and building 
up its spy network98.  Such conspiracy theories will inspire hate crimes against 
certain ethnic groups and communities.   
Wang Gungwu, the foremost expert in Chinese diasporas, warns of the 
danger of seeing a yellow peril whenever the Chinese migrate to another land 
because by the time they settle there, what were once central to their value 
system have become subsidiary.  The term “diaspora” is misleading when 
applied to different ethnic groups because it assumes that the dispersion is a 
concerted effort and there is unity among the immigrants. But wherever they 
settle, they are easily influenced by the environment and become different 
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from other groups settled elsewhere. Thus Chinese in the Philippines, 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are different from one another99. “Most 
overseas Chinese today no longer see themselves as sojourners, orphans, or 
patriotic Chinese nationalists whose welfare, sole future and final resting place 
is to be in China”100. The changes have been deep.   
Perhaps one reason for the inability to see the overseas Chinese as 
distinct from the mainland Chinese is that migration has been a recent affair, 
about a century in the making. The differences between the overseas Chinese 
and the mainland Chinese would be more clearly marked as time goes by. This 
is definitely true for the Peranakans, who are descendants of Chinese traders 
and local Malay women in Malaysia. Cultural transformations have taken 
place over centuries. Though subsequent generations still hold on to certain 
Chinese practices like ancestral worship and marriage, their beliefs, their 
worldview and their language have been transformed. Even though they are 
“overseas Chinese”, their distinct culture and their long settlement ensure that 
their political loyalty is not cast in doubt.  
The second reason may be that when overseas Chinese perform certain 
cultural practices, they are seen as maintaining linkage with their ancestral 
land. As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the celebration of Christmas and 
other Christian events do not necessarily mean that Christianity still occupies 
the same position as it did centuries ago. Similarly, the celebration of Chinese 
festivals such as Chinese New Year, Mid-Autumn Festival and Winter Solstice 
in Chinese communities around the world should not be mistaken for cultural 
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homogeneity. Increasingly, these festivals, even Chinese New Year, are used as 
occasions to holiday and the media often emphasizes on consumerism, rather 
than on the original spirit of the events. These Chinese set of values and 
customs do not necessarily form the central part of their lives when the 
Chinese settle overseas. They adapt to the environment and adopt local beliefs 
and customs. Local beliefs and values may over time form the core values of 
these individuals. Outwardly they may conform to the same practices but that 
is no guarantee that internally they are adopting the same set of values. The 
constancy of cultural practices is thus insufficient to prove that the people still 
hold on to traditional values, which is a state of consciousness. However, 
because humans are visual creatures, we often associate certain practices with 
certain mindsets.  This internal perspective is often missing when we judge 
others based on their behaviours.  
 Even then, one cannot fail to notice the cultural differences between 
certain overseas Chinese and mainland Chinese. Corruption has been a deep 
problem in the Chinese society. With Confucianism’s low opinion of law as a 
tool of governance101 as well as the lack of checks and balances in the imperial 
system (where the emperor had unlimited power and officials were usually not 
punished for bribery), corruption became a prevalent problem in every 
dynasty. Hence, in part due to the cultural influences of Confucianism and in 
part due to the political and legal systems, corruption seems an integral part of 
the Chinese. However, it is significant that two Chinese-majority states (and 
former British colonies)—Hong Kong and Singapore—have been able to 
eradicate this undesirable culture among the population and remain two of 
                                                 
101
 Analects 2:3. For more reasons behind Confucius’s lack of preference for the rule of law, one can 




the least corrupt countries in the world. It is no small achievement and its 
significance must be grasped. Through a series of tough political and legal 
actions, these two countries have managed to produce a new political 
culture—a set of values, norms and modes of thinking.  (One should resist the 
temptation to categorise the legal and political systems as parts of a culture 
because a new set of cultural values is an accidental product of legal and 
political systems. Legal judgements and policies do not often attempt to 
change the traditional values existing in a society; they also deal with non-
cultural issues like traffic rules, economic activities and health issues. 
Furthermore, legal and political systems are more definite, more structured 
and much more efficient than a culture. The next section should make the 
distinctions clearer.)    
The rule of law is not a trivial concept but governs the daily functioning 
of the society. It is not one among many values in a modern state; it is truly 
the foundation of the society in the sense that every important decision must 
be legally endorsed.  The judiciary, the legislative and the executive are 
governed by the laws and contravening these laws would void their authority. 
Ordinary citizens also must abide by these laws. In a society where the rule of 
law is weak, of which the traditional Chinese society is one of them, laws are 
arbitrary and can be changed for the convenience of those in power.  The 
change from the rule of man to the rule of law in any society can be considered 
a revolution which will change norms, values and modes of thinking of those 
affected.    
An episode will illustrate divergent viewpoints between overseas 
Chinese and PRC Chinese. Language and culture seem to bind Singapore 




would have an easier time investing in China. Singapore Minister Mentor Lee 
Kuan Yew stated in 1993, “We are ethnic Chinese. We share certain 
characteristics through common ancestry and culture…People feel a natural 
empathy for those who share their physical attributes. This sense of closeness 
is reinforced when they also share a basis for all business relations.”102 The 
rude awakening came a few years later when collaborating on an industrial 
park in Suzou. Singapore officials realised that there were fundamental 
cultural differences such as their attitudes toward law and contracts. Lee 
recounts the episode in his memoirs, saying that the Chinese from PRC did 
not take contracts as definite when agreed upon but insisted on constant 
negotiation even after they were signed103. Hence similarities in culture cannot 
be exaggerated for people from the two countries can have fundamental 
differences over what should be the dominant values in daily interactions. 
This episode is a poignant reminder that we should not assume cultural 
homogeneity despite similar ethnic make-up. What has happened is that the 
British culture of the respect for law has been successfully integrated with 
Singapore’s culture,104 producing a divergent growth.  
Lee too admits the difference in worldview between Chinese in the 
southern provinces of China (where many Singaporean Chinese came from) 
and current generation of Singaporeans even though they still share many 
customs: 
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We are so different in our outlook and view of the world and of 
our place in this world. Theirs is so huge a country that they feel 
absolutely confident there will be a seat for them at the top table 
once they have put themselves right, and it was only a matter of 
time. No Chinese doubts their ultimate destiny after they have 
restored their civilisation, the oldest in the world with 4,000 
years of unbroken history. We, the migrants who have cut our 
roots and transplanted ourselves on a different soil, in a very 
different climate, lack this self-confidence. We have serious 
doubts about our future, always wondering what fate has in store 
for us in an uncertain and fast-changing world105. 
 
So a closer examination of the diaspora phenomenon disputes the 
claim that they remain committed to their homeland. It certainly does not 
describe a large segment of the diasporas around the world, especially the 
Chinese communities, the Hispanic communities, etc. Often the basis for the 
claim is that these diasporadic communities still hold on to their cultural 
identities and practices. But as I have argued earlier, these outward actions 
are not a good reflection of the state of consciousness, which is internal. 
Rather, it is seen that government’s policies to integrate the community with 
the rest are crucial to whether the community will experience a change of 
allegiance.  If minority groups are unfairly treated by the government 
persistently and lack the opportunities to contribute in a meaningful way, they 
may consider moving to other places or worse, resort to violence to realise 
their aims. 
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Huntington’s claim of a transnational identity is in part based on 
observable practices. It is seen that while there are similar customs between 
the parent country and the diasporas, these are only outward similarities. The 
real differences, which Huntington misses, are the differences in worldview, 
perspective of history and beliefs that are of primary importance. This points 
to a serious theoretical flaw in his assumption and we shall closely examine 
his idea about a core-periphery system because it suggests that there is a core 
set of values that people of similar culture can agree to.  
 
II Cultural Diffusion 
Building on the concept of diasporas and how people of the same 
cultural descent can share the same set of values even when they venture 
overseas, Huntington postulates the kin country syndrome. As Huntington 
claims, “People and countries with similar cultures are coming together. 
People and countries with different cultures are coming apart”.106  Thus, kin 
countries rally behind core countries that share similar culture. The idea of a 
core and periphery states is an idea taken from colonialism. The centre 
referred to core Western states such as Britain that exerted its political control 
over its colonies through agents like the East India Company officials. Rather 
than having one centre and a periphery, Huntington constructs multiple 
centres and peripheries that he calls kin countries. The core states are usually 
powerful states that enjoy military and political strength while the kin 
countries are supposed to rally to the call of the core states in times of need. 
Cultural values are assumed to be homogeneous among the core states and kin 
countries and help create a transnational identity. Examples include China 
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and Chinese-populated states like Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. The 
Islamic civilization is however suffering from a crisis because it does not have 
a strong core state to rally the rest of the states107. 
The concept of core state and kin countries implies that there is only 
one dominant paradigm in one civilization and there is a hierarchy to ensure 
that values are kept uniform within the same civilization. Thus the West is 
unified because it believes in the rule of law, individualism, representative 
bodies, social pluralism, the separation of spiritual and temporal authority 
and has been heavily influenced by Catholicism and Protestantism.  Similarly, 
Chinese all over the world are unified because they subscribe to a common set 
of Confucian values, speak the same language and celebrate the same kind of 
festivals.  
But the analogy fails for two reasons. One, the original usage of the 
centre-periphery system must be distinguished from the current usage. The 
British Empire was able to maintain its hold on its colonies because it sent its 
representatives to govern over these lands as administrators. These 
representatives like Raffles and Francis Light reported and obeyed orders 
from the central authority. They planned and carried out policies after 
endorsement from the British parliament. The final court of appeal in Britain 
too could overrule the decision made in the court rooms of these colonies. In 
this context, the colonies did not enjoy any sovereignty because they were 
under the order of an empire.  
However, in the modern context, states are sovereign and are not under 
the political order of bigger and more powerful states. So in what sense do 
cultural values drive the policies of countries? Though culture may influence 
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the policies of a country, it does not determine them. Each country is still 
sovereign. If individual countries cannot choose but follow the course of action 
set by the core states, then their sovereignty is at stake.  The decisions by 
Singapore to make English rather than Mandarin the de facto language in 
official dealings (even though Mandarin is one of the official languages, there 
is a systematic preference for English) and to close down the only Chinese-
medium university in the 1970s show that pragmatism, rather than cultural 
loyalty rules. While culture is an important factor, it is not the overriding 
factor. The opposition of France and Germany to America’s policies in Iraq 
also shows that there is no strong line of command within the so-called 
structure of a civilization.   
But there is a more devastating critique. Huntington claims that “like 
tribes and nations, civilizations have political structures”108. For a system or a 
structure to exist, there must be a clear set of rules or commands that bind 
people together and in case of disputes, there should be an authoritative 
source to settle the disagreements and to punish the deviants. However, a 
culture is necessarily diffused in nature. A set of core values can only be 
sustained in “a small community closely knit by ties of kinship, common 
sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable environment”, for in a loosely 
organized society, those who reject the rules would have too little social 
pressure to fear109.  A company can maintain a dominant culture throughout 
the organization because its members join voluntarily and there is adequate 
incentives and penalties for individuals to conform. A tribe can do the same 
because the community is small. Huntington’s description of a core-periphery 
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system can thus succeed in a small and organized community where there is 
little mobility and the pressure to conform is great.  
But when members are spread across a large geographical area, the 
pressure to conform must necessarily be severely weakened. As noted in the 
experience of Chinese migrants who stopped regarding China as their 
homeland and began to contextualise their experiences in Malaya, it is similar 
with other diasporas. As they move away from the ancestral homes, their 
values and worldviews are re-ordered to adjust to the new environment. 
Unless they consciously benchmark their actions and values with the home 
country and keep up with the country’s affairs, their identity and values will 
likely be changed by the second generation.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to have uniformity over a large geographical 
area if there is clear line of command and adequate punishment and 
incentives. A political system, an army and a legal system can maintain 
uniformity in values and rules because these systems have an authoritative 
source to issue orders, settle disputes and punish deviation. That is not the 
case for cultural values. In a culture, there is no final arbiter who can settle 
differences in interpretation of cultural norms. A cultural system is necessarily 
diffused because there is no official authority to provide an authoritative 
account. As a result, there exists not one dominant paradigm but several 
cultures, each competing for adherents. In the cultural realm, there is no 
Supreme Court to settle a dispute once and for all and practitioners must be 
content with a large degree of ambiguity. There is also no special agent to 




“the individuals affected or the group at large”110. Such an unorganized way of 
punishing offenders is a serious obstacle to calling a civilization a political 
structure.  So in the cultural context, “the rules by which the group lives will 
not form a system, but will simply be a set of separate standards without any 
identifying or common mark”. 111  Mere convergence of behaviours among 
people in the core states and kin states does not necessarily show that there is 
a central authority which others are obliged to follow.  Unless it can be show 
that orders from the core state, if there are any, are regularly followed, 
Huntington’s claim of a transnational identity among the states cannot be 
established. The mechanism for creating such a situation cannot be clearly 
seen.   
The organized nature of a political/legal system explains an important 
feature that is absent in a culture or a civilization. While cultural practices will 
take time to change, policy changes can take effect overnight. While it will take 
generations to inculcate the practice of family planning among the masses and 
to replace the age-old belief of having a big family, a one-child policy can take 
effect overnight. Rather than depending on education, self-restraint and 
individual responsibility, as India does, China has overcome the problem of 
population explosion largely by legislation.  Because of their abilities to effect 
policies almost immediately, the political and legal systems can play an 
important role in sustaining, creating or disrupting certain cultural practices.   
Hence it introduces another factor into the cultural debate for the legal 
and political systems can also change the way of life in the country. This is why 
discussions about cultural values as if they were permanent and ever-lasting 
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seem to ignore the role that the legal and political systems can play in creating 
new norms and modes of thinking. The policy of meritocracy and equality can 
create a counter-culture more effective than any discriminatory practices 
inherited from traditional cultures. A low tolerance for corruption can also 
challenge prevalent social morality to create high standards of integrity among 
its people. It is also important to keep things in perspective for “very often, the 
law loses such battles with ingrained morality, and the moral rule continues in 
full vigour side by side with laws which forbid what it enjoins.”112  
Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between a culture and a 
political or a legal system. The political/legal system is highly organized, with 
agents to ensure conformity to the legal requirements and while policies and 
legislation can be affected by cultural beliefs (the law can favour certain 
customary practices over others), the structures of political and legal systems 
remain different from traditional culture which lacks the central authority to 
ensure organized punishment and finality of interpretation. Even if the 
successful implementation of a legal or a political system is dependent on 
whether the ideologies (such as the rule of law and democracy) are accepted 
widely, it is still true that they differ in organization. The culture of democracy 
will take years to cultivate while the political structure of democracy (with 
voting and regular election) can be set up in a short period, as seen in the case 
of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Hence they should be distinguished more by their 
methods than by the content.  
Culture, because of its diffused nature, cannot unite countries together. 
That explains why the history of Europe was marked more by conflict than 
harmony. Despite their similar culture that stretched back to the eighth 
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century, European countries were at war with one another for almost three 
centuries. During the era of colonial imperialism, France, England and 
Holland fought over precious trade routes and commodities and conquering 
countries after countries. Eventually the battle between these nation-states 
escalated into the First World War. The common Western culture also did not 
stop the Germans and the Italians from igniting the Second World War. Greed, 
the struggle for power and policy differences can trump commonality in 
culture and beliefs.  If culture has not proven to be a uniting force for 
numerous centuries, can it be so in recent years? 
It is important not to confuse a civilization with a political structure. 
The European Union is a political structure. It has a common currency, a 
common political council and a common constitution. Thus European 
countries (but not all countries in the Western civilization like America and 
Australia) are more united primarily because of a political system.  While it 
cannot be denied that a common culture has made the EU a reality and hence 
is the most persuasive example for Huntington, it must be remembered that it 
is the political system that makes Europe (not the entire Western civilization) 
united, not primarily its culture, as Huntington claims. Furthermore, other 
civilizations are far from displaying the same kind of political unity as Europe. 
Until that is realised, Huntington’s theory of core-periphery states in a 
civilization has limited application.  
All the previous examples show that the concept of unity among 
diversity, that all different parts of an orchestra can be harmonised into a 
whole, is seriously questionable. The idea that individuals must subscribe to 




characteristic of essentialism 113 .  To clarify the analogy, it must be 
remembered that a conductor and repeated rehearsal are needed to ensure 
that the different players are keeping in sync. However, in a culture, there is 
neither a conductor nor a central authority to ensure conformity to the 
traditions.  That is why even within the same civilization, countries can go to 
war because they do not necessarily subscribe to the same worldview.  Within 
a political party, though the leaders also have conflicts of opinions, party whip 
can ensure conformity to a higher degree.  
The danger of imputing commonality when there are fundamental 
differences cannot be over-stated. The hypothetical clash between Islam and 
other civilizations suggests that one billion Muslims are at war with the other 
three billion people. It is based on the assumption that there is only one 
interpretation of Islam and a strong line of command from the centre to 
member states. But as I have argued earlier, a civilization does not have the 
structure to issue an authoritative interpretation. Although only a small 
segment of the Muslim world subscribe to the fundamentalist version of Islam, 
it gets the most attention because of its violent nature. According to Zakaria, 
“The real problem lies not in the Muslim world but in the Middle East”, for 
“the Arab world is a political desert with no real political parties, no free press, 
and few pathways for dissent”114. Political oppression has caused a segment of 
the Arabs, most notably Osama bin Laden, to turn to fundamentalism but 
many Middle Eastern Muslims are still moderates. Outside the Middle East, a 
vast majority of the Muslims are peace loving and reject the onslaught of 
terrorism.  
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 The heavy losses of the Islamic fundamentalist party in Malaysian 
General Election in 2004 showed that Muslims in Malaysia were not fervent 
for the Taleban brand of Islam. It is also important to highlight how Muslims 
in the largest Muslim nation of Indonesia practice their faith compared to 
their Arabic counterparts. The Indonesia election 2004 showed that parties 
that used religion did not make substantial gains. A survey in 2002 showed 
that the majority supported Islamic law but refused to let the government 
determine their religious faith. In a further analysis of the results, a solid 
majority (65 per cent) took a neutral stance towards Islamism and only 14 per 
cent could be labeled as strong or moderate Islamist. The general public was 
unwilling to let Islam be instituted as the national religion115, thus preserving 
the separation of State and Islam.    
These two examples aim to show that there are divergent 
interpretations of Islam in the Muslim world. Many Muslims in Southeast 
Asian countries do not engage in violence and terrorism, contrary to popular 
belief. Huntington writes, “In Malaysia and Indonesia, Muslims periodically 
riot against Chinese, protesting their domination of the economy”116. While it 
is true that Malays clashed with Chinese during the May 1969 incident, it was 
more because of unequal distribution of wealth than the religion factor. The 
fact that there has been no racial riot between the two groups shows that the 
underlying cause of conflict has been dealt with. 
The danger of pitting a clash between the West and the Muslim world is 
that it obfuscates the struggle within the Muslim world. A battle of ideas is 
raging between moderate Muslims who tolerate diversity and a small group of 
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extremist Muslims who insists on a narrow vision of the good life. Although 
terrorists target Western countries like America, Spain and Britain, they also 
attack Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey and Pakistan. By 
positing a struggle between the West and the Islam, the West has made it 
difficult for moderate Muslim governments to keep extremism under control 
without appearing to be too pro-West. Western countries should seek alliance 
with Muslim countries that are firm against terrorism and not stereotype 
Muslim nations as bearing vengeance against the West. The Defense Science 
Board too notes the “larger goals of U.S. strategy depend on separating the 
vast majority of non-violent Muslims from the radical-militant Islamist 
jihadist. But American efforts have not only failed in respect. They may also 
have achieved the opposite of what they intended”.117  
A survey of all the three key civilizations in Huntington’s thesis shows 
that a civilization is not a political system that displays cultural homogeneity. 
Cultural values are necessarily diffused and there can be multiple and 
conflicting viewpoints within the civilizations, either in Europe, or China or 
the Muslim world. There is thus a need to review the inaccuracies in 
Huntington’s model that purports that kin countries will rally together with 
the core states to fight against another civilization. Because of Huntington’s 
tendency to view countries of similar culture as a whole, the framework does 
not address issues that may divide the civilization. So in the Islamic world, 
there is a struggle of idea between the moderates and the extremists, and 
superpowers like the America and Britain should aid the moderate Muslims in 
the fight against terrorism. There are also serious political suppression and 
persecution in certain Middle Eastern countries which must be addressed to 
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weed out the root of discontent. To view the rise in terrorism as a clash 
between civilizations is to misdiagnose the problems and to prescribe the 


























Chapter 5 Cultural Determinism 
 
In speaking about local group conflicts we tend to make three 
assumptions: first, that ethnic identities are ancient and 
unchanging; second, that these identities motivate people to 
persecute and kill; and third, that ethnic diversity itself 
inevitably leads to violence. All three are mistaken.  
John R. Bowen 
                                                      “The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict” 
 
I The Inevitable Clash? 
Previous chapters dispute the claim that there is a necessary connection 
between a civilization and its core values in time and space. In this chapter, we 
try to show how the claim, if left unchallenged, will necessarily lead to cultural 
determinism. Cultural determinism is the belief that cultural values will 
determine the actions of individuals and individuals will be unable or 
foolhardy to change the course of history. This chapter shows that implicit in 
Huntington’s claim is the lack of free will in determining one’s cultural values. 
It can be interpreted as cultural fatalism or cultural determinism. The former 
does not hinder the possibility of changing one’s cultural values while the 
latter is untenable.  As the result of the lack of free will, the explanatory power 
of cultural essentialism is limited. The second part is to examine the causes of 
conflicts in the Islamic world if the doctrine of cultural essentialism cannot 
accurately explain the situations. 
As a political analyst, Huntington hopes to produce successful 




he searches for causes that can explain human behaviour. Culture is presented 
as the grand force that will shape the pattern of cohesion, disintegration and 
conflict in the modern world. Individuals within a civilization are thus 
presented as subservient to the cultural imperative and unable to change their 
cultural destiny.  As he says, “Political leaders imbued with hubris to think 
that they can fundamentally reshape the culture of their societies are destined 
to fail...Political leaders can make history but they cannot escape history.”118  
The idea of cultural determinism is not a new one. One of the founders 
of sociology, Auguste Comte, seeing the success in the natural sciences, argues 
that we should see the sciences and the humanities as one unitary system of 
knowledge that is governed by one method119. This does not mean just being 
precise in one’s research but it also involves importing other assumptions 
from the sciences such as the belief that the behaviour of men is controlled “by 
causes largely beyond the control of individuals; for instance by the influence 
of physical factors or of environment or of custom”120. This assumption that 
individuals are determined by their past, civilization and even their biology 
and environment was what led to Communism and Nazism—both extreme 
attempts to look for inevitable forces that govern human behaviour.   
Huntington’s work also builds on this theme. Not only are individuals 
seen as slaves to whatever cultural value that is dominant, all explanations of 
human intentions are reduced to “a mixture of vanity and stubborn 
ignorance”121. In support of his view that it is human to hate, he quotes 
Einstein who says that “man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction” 
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and Freud agrees that people are animals and they have only two instincts, 
“Those that seek to preserve and unite…and those which seek to destroy and 
kill.”122 Hatred can drive one to engage in an endless cycle of violence. This is 
also how he characterises a fault line war, a war between people of two 
different cultures or civilizations:  
 
Fault line wars go through processes of intensification, 
expansion, containment, interruption and rarely, resolution. 
These processes usually begin sequentially, but they also overlap 
and may be repeated. Once started, fault line wars, like other 
communal conflicts, tend to take on a life of their own and to 
develop in an action-reaction pattern”123. 
 
  An image that the phrase “a fault line war” connotes is that of plate 
tectonics. As is commonly known, two continental plates, propelled by natural 
forces, will create an earthquake when they clash with each other. This 
geographical analogy rightly connotes the horror and atrocity when such 
situation does happen.  So the continental plates are synonymous with core 
values of a culture and these core values will drive people to bandwagon with 
people of the same culture, repel those from a different culture and drive them 
to war. Just as humans are unable to stop the physical force, so it is assumed 
that they cannot stop the cultural force.  However, I think the analogy is 
flawed for two reasons.  
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First, even during a natural disaster, human intervention can make a 
difference. The Asian tsunami disaster and Hurricane Katrina have reminded 
us of the potency of natural forces.  In the face of such natural disasters, it 
seems that there is little humans can do to minimise the damages. However, 
this is far from true. Though humans cannot prevent these disasters from 
taking place, there are ways to minimise the loss of lives and property. In both 
disasters, it has been found that human errors play an important part in the 
high casualty rates.  For example, many countries greatly affected by the 
tsunami had no tsunami warning systems and those working or staying near 
the coastal areas did not receive any warning to escape from the disaster zones. 
Similarly, weather forecasters under-estimated the force of Hurricane Katrina 
and as a result, many of the residents were not sufficiently prepared for the 
worst. The central government also did not send enough aid and 
reinforcement in time to cope with the aftermath, resulting in grave chaos.   
  In some cases, it is possible for human effort to overcome hostile 
climatic conditions. For example, Nobel Prize economist Amartya Sen argues 
that “no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and 
democratic country with a relatively free press. We cannot find an exception to 
this rule, no matter where we look: the recent famine of Ethiopia, Somalia or 
other dictatorial regimes.”124 While it is common to link famine to natural 
disasters like droughts and floods, he argues that the primary cause of famine 
is the unwillingness of the government to intervene and help relieve hunger. 
The absence of free press and opposition parties in dictatorial regimes 
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suppresses such vital information from the people and perpetuates faulty 
government policies125.   
Second, the analogy assumes that there is a world of cultural ideas 
independent of the agent. Alfred Whitehead coined this error as the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness. The mistake arises because abstract metaphysical 
nouns are treated as concrete individual things. Thus Plato believes that red 
things may change but redness may not change; beautiful things are mixed 
with ugliness but beauty is not. But it is more reasonable to assume that these 
Forms exist in the mind of a Supreme Being and not in themselves126. So 
cultural values are created and sustained by humans and are not forces that 
are out of human control. 
This physical analogy removes the role of the agent. Ultimately clashes 
among civilizations are really clashes among people of different beliefs. When 
people are oppressed by customs and traditions, we are really saying that a 
group uses traditional values to coerce another group to adopt certain cultural 
paths. Values are composed and chosen by people and political leaders. They 
are not metaphysical entities or laws of nature that propel people to move 
inevitably towards a position of strife. By putting people at the centre of the 
process, we are in a clearer position to understand the nature of conflicts. Are 
people so driven by cruelty, hatred and ill intent that they cannot be stopped 
from the vicious cycle of violence? Or if they are in a culture that promotes 
poor values like corruption and nepotism, should they just resign to fate?  
It must be made clear that the degree of human potency is seen as 
higher for people in the Western civilization. Huntington suggests that the 
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West is able to reverse the decay in its civilization127  but he provides no 
strategy for the continued demise of the Islamic civilization. In his selection of 
data, the huge conflicts among the European nations in the last few centuries 
are consciously omitted and violence associated with other civilizations is not 
generalized to the West. Again, this is dualism at work. Though Huntington 
portrays other civilizations to be suffering from cultural determinism, and are 
slaves to non-progressive values like violence and the lack of the rule of law, 
the West is portrayed as a dynamic civilization, able to arrest its decline and 
choose its path of growth. But even then, he warns of the danger of shifting its 
civilization identity. An America that tries to be multicultural will be a torn 
country like Turkey. So even though individuals in the West are empowered, 
their actions are still restricted by a cultural norm. They suffer from a weaker 
form of cultural determinism. 
It is undeniable that people have the need to be accepted and at times, 
the push to follow customary rules can be very strong. One can be severely 
punished, driven out of home and even disowned for breaking the cultural 
norms, like converting to another religion or befriending the enemy. It is true 
that because of such persecution, truths may be “thrown back for centuries”, 
as was the case with twenty attempts of Reformation before Martin Luther 
succeeded128. Thus we must be realistic about the power of traditions and 
dogmas in systematically discouraging deviation from the norm.  
Of course, the force of culture is not as strong as the political structure. 
With the ability of political leaders to systematically devise policies to ensure 
conformity and to have the police and the army to punish deviants, the state 
                                                 
127 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 303-306.  
128
 J. S. Mill, On Liberty in On Liberty in Focus, ed. John Gray and G. W. Smith (London: Routledge, 




has a greater ability to coerce its people. The civil examination system in the 
Imperial China with the promise of high court positions had probably 
suffocated dissent and diversity of thoughts among literati and intelligentsia.  
In recent times, the massacres of political opponents by tyrants like Saddam 
Hussein and Pol Pot have shown how the development of countries can be 
greatly hindered.      
But even under the weight of great resistance, both political and 
cultural, it is hard to deny that there are exceptional individuals who can lead 
nations or organizations to greatness. We first turn our attention to 
individuals who achieve greatness despite great physical disability. One can 
think of the Guinness World Record holder paraplegic Dr William Tan who 
recently managed to finish 7 marathons across 7 continents. This is certainly a 
remarkable achievement for a man of his condition. Again, we can think of 
handicaps like Beethoven and Helen Keller who managed to overcome their 
physical disabilities to impact the lives of many. What becomes clear from 
these examples is that individuals do not interpret the same objective 
conditions in the same way. While physical handicap is a great limiting force 
to many, how one makes meaning out of it can enable one to achieve things 
that are unimaginable. This is connected to the claim that I have made in 
Chapter 3. It is because humans have the ability to construct meanings out of 
the same condition that we do not have to respond in the same way.  But the 
claim must not be exaggerated. It is true that for every Helen Keller, many 
more would have succumbed to the abject condition. Huntington’s depiction 
of human nature thus focuses on the median rather than the exceptional. To 
him, human reaction is common and brutish. He claims that it is human 




that people have the capacity to react differently. The law of human nature is 
not really law in the strictest sense of world. While no one can disobey the law 
of gravity, it is possible to escape from cyclical human behaviour.  Great men 
like Mandela Nelson, Gandhi and Lee Kuan Yew do not emerge from the zone 
of comfort but from adverse circumstances. They work against oppressive 
systems and traditions and take the path of the greatest resistance. Faced with 
the same kind of harsh conditions, certain individuals can thrive and while 
many may succumb to the ordeal. Mihaly Csikszenmihalyi, a renowned 
psychologist, has done research on the amazing ability of humans to thrive 
under the most severe conditions. While it is typical to expect individuals to 
crumble under extremely harsh conditions, it is too hasty to extend the 
judgment to all. Having interviewed numerous survivors of harrowing 
conditions like being lost in Antarctica, being held in solitary confinement, 
and those who went through the Holocaust, Csikszenmihalyi discovers that 
they manage to transfer these seemingly harsh experiences to manageable and 
even enjoyable struggles.129  
At the societal level, how individuals make meaning out of the same 
objective conditions can make a difference.  We can look at the movie of 
Schindler’s List which is based on a true account. Unlike many Germans who 
were cowered by the Nazis, Schindler helped thousands of Jews escape from 
the concentration camps because he was able to see beyond the difficulties 
and dangers.  A nation can also be transformed by a coterie of dedicated 
individuals who can see beyond the differences. America in the 1960s was on 
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the verge of a civil war but because of the collective leadership of people like 
John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, a racial riot was averted. 
Even in a climate of rampant violence and revenge, one can break out 
of it. While aggressive behaviour and the lust for destruction are present 
within mankind, it does not preclude the ability to reflect on them and react 
otherwise. Rationally, revenge is a poor option because destruction will lead to 
more destruction and more deaths. Though instinct to hate can be strong, 
there can be another instinct that teaches us to love and forgive, and this 
cannot be smothered even within a community that is surrounded by violence. 
The situation seems idealistic but it has happened in real life. One example is 
that of Gordon Wilson—the man who helped put an end to IRA terrorism. In 
1987, an IRA bomb detonated in Belfast, killing Wilson’s twenty-year-old 
daughter. Instead of revenge, Wilson chose to forgive the perpetrators and 
hold on to his belief that “love is the bottom line”. He led a crusade for the 
reconciliation between Protestant and Catholic, personally met the IRA and 
forgave them and persuaded them to lay down their arms. The Irish Republic 
finally made him a member of the Senate and he was honoured for his deed 
when he died in 1995130.  While Europe experienced religious wars for many 
centuries, the fact that Catholicism and Protestantism can co-exist peacefully 
today shows that there is a way to overcome past hurts and cultural 
determinism. 
If determinism were true, freedom and responsibility would acquire a 
totally different kind of meaning in our vocabulary. It would have 
repercussions on other concepts like fairness, justice and heroism. For in the 
legal system, to assign punishment in a fair way would mean that the 
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individual has the ability to choose and act otherwise.  If it has been found 
that we possess some genes that predispose us to commit crimes, as some 
scientists claim, then it would pose great difficulties for the legal system. The 
notions of justice and punishment in war crime tribunals are similarly based 
on the idea that each person is responsible for his action, no matter how 
strong his cultural motivation is. Otherwise it is a great travesty to jail a 
person for ethnic cleansing.  Similarly, praise would be meaningless if heroic 
acts are not done out of personal conviction but because we are programmed 
to behave in that way131.  Hence it seems a prudential argument to reject 
determinism for it would leads to much contradiction in our current reality.  
It can be the case that individuals do not believe they have the ability to 
change the course of a culture and are swept by the tide of change. This is the 
doctrine of fatalism where individual thinks that they cannot influence a path 
of action. Fatalism is the perceived lack of free will while determinism is the 
lack of free will. To accept determinism is true would undermine all categories 
of freedom and responsibility. To accept fatalism as true is to remain unaware 
of one’s ability to make a difference in the world. It is an equally influential 
but devastating ideology that has brought about poverty in numerous 
countries. How can citizens find the will to cultivate their lands or be 
enterprising when at the end, their effort will come to naught? How can 
citizens express their creativity and innovation when deviation from the norm 
is not just frowned upon but also severely punished? How can individuals stop 
the patterns of violence if they are overwhelmed by the force of tradition? In 
the scheme of fatalism, personal choice makes little difference. Thus the Iraqis 
may engage in repeated pattern of violence because they think they cannot do 
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otherwise and are in a sense forced into it. However, the very fact that they 
have taken a course of action, no matter under how much duress, indicates 
that they have made a choice, even if it were a poor decision.   For if an 
individual merely follows the habit of thoughts passed down from the previous 
generation, then he will not be able to introduce radically new ideas.  
In a country filled with fatalism, it is still possible to expect great 
leaders to rise up for there are people who view things differently. Though the 
majority may believe in fatalism, there are still a few who choose to make a 
difference. Former Singapore Permanent Secretary Ngiam Tong Dow says this 
of Chinese culture, “For far too long, we Chinese have been resigned to the 
belief that corruption and nepotism are rooted in Chinese culture. To accept 
this grave prognosis is to repeat the tragic Chinese history of the rise and fall 
of dynasties and regimes.”132 It is certainly to the credit of the Singapore 
government that the country manages to shrug off the culture of corruption. 
Huntington is partially right in emphasizing the need of individuals to 
be accepted and be secure within a community. It can of course lead to 
tyranny of the majority where individuals suppress their desires to conform to 
what the group wants. But that tendency must be balanced with an active part 
of an individual. For though the tendency to remain in a group is strong, there 
are individuals who dare to get out of the comfort zone and oppose the norms 
of the community. This critical ability of individuals to assess what is right and 
wrong without subscribing to the view of the community is smothered under 
the weight of cultural essentialism.  
Another major shortcoming of cultural essentialism is its lack of 
predictive and explanatory power. As I have shown in the previous two 
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chapters, cultural essentialism often explains a phenomenon with reference to 
certain persistent cultural qualities. However, cultural values can change 
drastically and especially in a global age where cultures interact more 
frequently than before, changes will take place at a faster pace. In a less 
developed setting, cultural essentialism may have more explanatory power but 
with greater changes and mobility, its effectiveness will greatly diminished. 
For example, Weber predicted that Confucianism was not compatible with 
capitalism but that proved to be false with the rise of the “Asian Tigers”—
Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea. Similarly, Weber predicted 
that Protestant ethic would ensure the prosperity of Northern Europe and the 
Catholic South would remain in poverty. As it turns out, Italy and France have 
grown faster than their Protestant neighbours over the last 50 years133.  
In the post-mortem of the Asian Economic crisis, “Asian values” of 
nepotism and corruption were often blamed. But these negative traits could 
not be the primary causes for they had been with the economies thirty years 
ago, in the beginning years of prosperity. Thus there must be other factors at 
work like weak banking systems and over-borrowing. 134 The Enron crisis and 
widespread accounting frauds in the business community also show that 
America is not immune to corruption. So individuals can corrupt a system that 
may have worked well for decades and to place the blame solely on the 
cultural factor is to misdiagnose the issue.     
Zakaria too challenges the myth that Chinese and Indian cultures have 
always been conducive to capitalism, as modern scholars claim. The ironical 
part is that for the Chinese had done poorly in economy for hundreds of years 
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and it is the same for Indians even four decades after Independence135. If 
culture were the most important feature and if Confucianism were conducive 
to trade and industry, China would have prospered for much of its history. But 
in fact, Chinese merchants occupied one of the lowest ranks in society and the 
occupation was greatly frowned upon.  The conclusion that Zakaria gathers is 
that government policies, rather than cultural traits, account for a country’s 
success more than anything else. A well-implemented policy is able to reverse 
the poor qualities in a culture and reverse its negative effect. 
The unprincipled approach taken by cultural essentialism is seen in the 
above examples. Scholars and politicians have argued at different times that 
Confucianism is compatible and incompatible with capitalism. The reason is 
not plain to see. As I have shown in the previous chapter, there are multiple 
schools of interpretations within a culture but no definitive version. As such, 
scholars and politicians can pick the interpretation that best fits their 
predictions depending on the circumstances.  The doctrine of cultural 
essentialism is thus not easily falsifiable because it can accommodate varying 
situations.  
Cultural essentialism also cannot explain the increase in violence in the 
Middle East from the 1970s. For if Islam had been violent in nature, Muslims 
all over the world should exhibit similar kind of behaviour all along. The fact 
that violence is restricted to a select group of Muslims in the last few decades 
should alert us to the fact that Islam is not the real source of the problems. 
Furthermore, cultural essentialism often emphasizes homogeneity but 
neglects the multiplicities of cultures and thus, it seems that the entire Muslim 
world is in opposition to other civilizations. But the conflicts and acts of 
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terrorism, as I have shown in the previous chapter, involve only a small 
segment of the fundamentalist Muslims. The gap in explanatory power is too 
huge for us to have much confidence in cultural essentialism. If we want to get 
a clearer picture of the causes of violence in the Muslim world, we should 
explore other factors.  
 
II Causes of Conflicts 
If I have shown that cultural determinism fails to explain the situation 
in the Muslim world correctly, then we must seek other possible causes of 
conflicts. In Chapter 3, I argue that violence is not inherent in Islam. I shall 
provide another reason why the culture of violence cannot explain the 
conflicts in the Muslim world. Huntington writes, “The antagonism of 
Muslims towards the United States stems in part from American support for 
Israel. It also has deeper roots in the fear of American power, envy of 
American wealth, resentment of what is perceived as American domination 
and exploitation, and hostility to American culture, secular and religious, as 
the antithesis of Muslim cultures.”136  Like most of his portrayal of Muslims, 
they are seen as irrational and acting out of hatred, envy and violence. Though 
he admits that policy failure plays a part in the rise in Muslim violence, he 
thinks that the psyche of the Muslims is the real problem. In this view, there is 
no prior reason for their negative disposition towards America. They are just 
irrational and behave differently from normal human beings. But there is a 
formidable obstacle to this view of human motivation. For no one acts cruelly 
and violently because he thinks that it is bad. People do bad things either 
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because they have mistaken it for the good thing or because they pursue the 
good thing by a wrong means.  
Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wisely points out that 
decent people can be persuaded to do evil things if they see that evil is not evil 
but the pursuit of the good: 
 
Romans saw glory in the pillage of the Parthians; pious Catholic 
saw purity of faith in the Spanish Inquisition; the United States’ 
founding fathers saw economic necessity in slavery; Bosnian 
Serbs saw justice for past wrong in ethnic cleansing. Even many 
Nazi collaborators and appeasers were sure they were doing the 
right thing; after all what can be more moral than “peace in our 
time”? In 1940, the poet Archibald MacLeish wrote, “Murder is 
not absolved of immorality by committing murder. Murder is 
absolved of immorality by bringing men to think that murder is 
not evil. This only the perversion of the mind can bring137. 
 
Evil is not the primary motivation of action. Humans do not behave in 
an evil way because they enjoy evil but because they mistake the evil for the 
good. We must then reject Huntington’s attribution of violence as an inherent 
quality of Islam. People do not commit violence because they take delight in 
violence but they see violence as a means to the good.  Violence is thus the 
consequence, not the primary cause. The fatalistic approach suggested by 
Huntington that, “Muslims increasingly see America as their enemy. If that is 
a fate America cannot avoid, their only alternative is to accept it and to take 
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the measures necessary to cope with it”138 is therefore unwarranted. People do 
not take delight in seeing the other person as the enemy unless there are 
underlying issues of injustice and unfairness involved.  
As one of the greatest evidence for the clash of civilizations is fueled by 
Al-Qaeda and its terror attacks, we will do well to read Osama bin Laden’s 
speech and determine what the cause of the friction is. It is common to 
dismiss Osama as insane and not take his speeches seriously. But an insane 
man could not have planned something as elaborate as the September-11 
terror attack. It takes a lot of intelligence to orchestrate such a complex 
mission and thus we should view Osama as a highly intelligent person who 
thinks that he is doing good when he is not.  
The political outcome of labelling someone as insane or irrational or 
less than a human is that no dialogue is possible. The act of communication 
presupposes a respect for the other party. A person will listen intently to 
someone whom he respects and thinks is capable of decent thought but if the 
partner turns out to be otherwise, all forms of dialogue will cease. That is what 
happens between the Muslim population and the American government. By 
hiding behind prejudices and irrational portrayal of the other party, the real 
problems are not discussed but the perceived problems take centre-stage. But 
in our daily communication, we know that guessing the causes of conflict can 
never be as accurate as finding it out first-hand. So we turn to the speech from 
Osama made right after the September-11 attack: 
And what America is facing today is something very little of what 
we have tasted for decades. Our nation, since nearly 80 years, is 
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tasting this humility. Sons are killed, and nobody answers the 
call. And when God has guided a bunch of Muslims to be at the 
forefront and destroyed America, a big destruction, I wish God 
would lift their position. And when those people have defended 
and retaliated to what their brothers and sisters have suffered in 
Palestine and Lebanon, the whole world has been shouting. And 
there are civilians, innocent children being killed every day in 
Iraq without any guilt, and we never hear anybody. We never 
hear any fatwah from the clergymen of the government. And 
every day we see the Israeli tanks going to Jenin, Ramallah, Beit 
Jalla and other lands of Islam. And, no, we never hear anybody 
objecting to that139. 
So looking at the transcript, it seems that what drove him to commit 
the September-11 terror attack was not because of envy against America and 
its democracy. Such a motivation would, proportionally speaking, be 
inadequate to result in such a catastrophic event. Rather what had driven him 
to such atrocities were issues of justice, fairness and equality. He argued that 
there was no public outcry when Israel invaded the lands of Palestine. Neither 
was there any concern when innocent lives were terminated in Iraq and other 
Muslim lands. The callous disregard for human life and dignity was fuelling 
the hatred.  
One may object that this is a politically motivated speech and the real 
reasons are hidden behind such noble causes. He could be creating the war for 
personal gains and glories or the events of the Afghan-Russia war could have 
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triggered his intention to take revenge on America for abandoning 
Afghanistan. However, looking at Osama’s speeches, he shows a remarkable 
consistency in his theme. We may never know his real reasons for attacking 
but solving the problems listed in the speech will make the fundamentalist 
cause a less attractive one. The current problem is that America is not actively 
addressing the issues. Instead it has given the fundamentalists more support 
by the unstable situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ill treatment of the 
Iraqi soldiers in the Abu Ghraib jail has also contributed to the crisis.  
In a report from the Defence Science Board, findings suggest that 
America is losing its war of ideas because of its faulty policies in the Middle 
East. America’s one-sided support of Israel and constant denial of Palestinian 
rights, its support of tyrannical governments like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan as well as the deteriorating condition in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
left the Muslim world increasingly unconvinced about America’s intention to 
help.140  
But the failure of policies is not only restricted to America. The failure 
of policies also occurs in Middle Eastern countries. Zakaria argues that the 
failure of politics and economy has caused the rise of Muslim fundamentalism. 
Political reform, ushered in by Egypt’s Nasser, quickly went wrong and 
reforms became stagnant. The Egyptian government is “only efficient in one 
area: squashing dissent and strangling civil society”. Shockingly Egypt has 
done better than its neighbours. Syria, Iraq and Lebanon have leaders that are 
despots and exert overwhelming power over every aspect of people’s lives. 
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Thousands of citizens are killed for opposing the regime and lives have low 
value in these countries141.  
As a result of these policy failures, Islamic civilization is suffering from 
decay. As described by Quigley, this is a period of 
 
Acute economic depression, declining standards of living, civil 
wars between the various vested interests, and growing illiteracy. 
The society grows weaker and weaker. Vain efforts are made to 
stop the wastage by legislation. But the decline continues. The 
religious, intellectual, social, and political levels of society began 
to lose the allegiance of the masses of the people on a larger scale. 
New religious movements begin to sweep over the society. There 
is a growing reluctance to fight for the society or even to support 
it by paying taxes.142  
 
These are symptoms that are manifest in numerous Middle-Eastern societies 
and though the passage has come from Huntington’s book, he fails to 
associate these features with the Middle East. Because the Middle East is in a 
state of decay, the culture of violence is prevalent. As Huntington is 
committed to cultural essentialism, he extrapolates the current situation of 
violence to the beginning of the Islamic civilization, projecting a linear history 
of violence.  The analysis thus becomes flawed.  
In the same way, blaming the Muslim terrorists in Southern Thailand 
and Chechnya is merely one side of the story. The reasons for their revolt are 
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more likely due to failed policies than any inherent qualities in the Muslim 
culture. The unprovoked aggression of storming the historic Krue Se mosque 
by Thai commandos quickly evaporated the “little trust between Bangkok and 
the Muslim community”. What had made matters worse was the 
indiscriminate closure of all pondoks (Muslim religious schools), further 
alienating the Muslim population. 143 What could have alleviated the situation 
are fairer terms of integration.    
The war between Russia and Chechnya started more than 200 years 
ago. Like all empires, Russia expanded its territories by colonizing its 
immediate neighbours. But unlike more benign empires that left behind useful 
institutions or commercial traditions to their colonies, Russia usually left 
behind extensive damage. The pattern of violence and wanton use of force was 
repeated when Chechnya wanted a special status within Russia a few years ago. 
President Putin’s continual use of force144 to maintain the territorial integrity 
will unfortunately worsen the situation.  Unless there is a dialogue between 
the two parties, the violence will continue.  
A detailed exploration of the causes of violence in the Muslim world is 
beyond the scope of the paper. However I hope the reader is convinced that 
culture is insufficient to account for the circumstances. Violence is the 
consequence, not the primary cause. Thus to win in the war of ideas, countries 
must re-examine their treatment of minorities or whether unfair and 
oppressive policies have driven its citizens to rebellion. This is a better 
solution than to resign to one’s cultural destiny and continue the cycle of 
violence. To accept that the enemy is violent by nature and no amount of 
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policy changes can improve matter is a form of fatalism. Clearly cultural 
essentialism obscures rather than illuminates on vital situations and policies 
based on this assumption will be severely ineffective. If that much is clear, we 
should move away from the doctrine and construct an alternative theory of 










































Chapter 6:  A New Outline 
 
Trace even the Puritan mother back through history and she 
represents a rebellion against the Cavalier laxity of the English 
Church, which was at first a rebel against the Catholic 
civilisation, which had been a rebel against the Pagan 
civilisation. Nobody but a lunatic could pretend that these 
things were a progress; for they obviously go first one way and 
then the other.  
G. K. Chesterton 
                                                       St. Thomas Aquinas: The Dumb Ox 
 
I Lessons from the Philosophy of Science 
The previous chapters have criticized the shortcomings of Huntington’s efforts 
in describing a civilization and its interaction with other civilization. The 
errors are instructive enough to merit a second summary. The first faulty 
assumption is the fixity of core values. Huntington assumes that Islam has 
bloody borders based on statistics but as I have shown, such data can only 
show an empirical connection between violence and Islam. In any case, the 
assertion is based on the situation in Muslim countries of the late twentieth 
century and is thus myopic. Similarly I question whether the rule of law has 
always been a defining feature of the Western civilization when an important 
feature, the independence of the judiciary, did not exist till the eighteenth 
century. Missing in Huntington’s account is the idea that each age is a 
revolution against the old one. The same set of values can exist but it is not 




prestige and supremacy of these values can be supplanted by another set of 
values. Though Christianity was a defining feature of Europe, its shrinking 
role in the public domain and its exclusion from the EU Constitution show 
that it has lost its dominant position. Huntington claims that the loss of core 
values will lead to the disintegration of a society but upon closer examination, 
it is merely a change of identity without an increase in social ills or political 
instability.   
The second mistake is to assume the homogeneity of values across 
space. Thus it is believed that diasporas are disloyal to their host countries 
because they still subscribe to the core beliefs of their parent countries. While 
this is true of certain groups of people, it cannot be generalized to diasporas in 
general. Through an exploration of how Chinese migrants made Malaya their 
homeland and the profound disagreement between Singapore and China, I 
hope to show that people of similar cultural descent do not necessarily 
subscribe to the same set of values and they may have fundamental 
disagreements. This is true of the West even if countries share similarities like 
representative bodies, European languages and the history of Christianity. 
Centuries of religious and civil wars shows that unity based on cultural 
homogeneity is illusory. Berlin’s argument that the parts need not harmonise 
with the whole is a profound truth that undermines the very concept of a core-
periphery system, especially in a diffused system like culture. 
The third faulty assumption is that civilizations will clash because their 
innate qualities will propel them towards that direction.  Again, that is an 
inaccurate description. By picturing civilizations as impersonal forces that will 
chart the course of history, Huntington downplays the primacy of agent in 




Chinese and Indian cultures are compatible with entrepreneurship, but as 
Zakaria points out, these two civilizations had been dismal in economic 
achievements for centuries. So the meteorite rise of these two countries should 
be attributed primarily to wise policies, not their cultures. But the mistake of 
cultural determinism goes deeper than this. It assumes that humans are 
conditioned by their societies to behave in certain ways, especially in the cycle 
of violence and are unable to do otherwise. This will eliminate all notions of 
freedom and moral responsibility. Without the choice to behave otherwise, we 
cannot attribute any kind of blame to criminals and wrongdoers. Neither can 
we give praise to heroes for they will merely be automatons. That will 
undermine the notion of punishment in the legal system, a foundation of 
modern society.  
Clearly, there is a need to construct a new account of cultural 
development. The new model of culture has to take into account the 
fundamental facts of cultural revolutions, multiplicities and human agency.  
While it will be good to have a comprehensive theory of culture, the project 
will be beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, my task is to show the outline 
of a more plausible theory of culture.  We must first start with certain human 
conditions that are underemphasized in Huntington’s model. The most 
important assumption is that all humans have their own visions of happiness 
and will spend time and resources to realize these aims. The extent to which 
the dominant culture will help realize those aims of happiness will determine 
the longevity of the cultural values. It is also a two-way process in the sense 
that the culture may also define the concept of happiness for the masses. 
However, because individuals have the ability to choose, they can create or 




culture. With globalization, this option is increasingly open to many. In a free 
society where government intervention is minimum, more alternative cultures 
can be created to meet divergent concepts of happiness. When the dominant 
culture is increasingly unable to meet the needs of the people, a sub-culture 
may supplant its position and become the dominant paradigm. Unlike in 
Huntington’s framework, individuals are not uniform in their behaviour and 
thought but possess creativity, imagination and the ability to view things from 
different perspectives. Hence the resulting theory of culture will be more 
dynamic than Huntington’s. 
To understand how cultures develop, we can perhaps turn to the 
philosophy of science.  For a long time, it was commonly accepted that the 
enterprise of science was about a successive accumulation of facts. However, 
prominent philosopher Thomas Kuhn is dissatisfied with this view, as it does 
not explain the fundamental differences in worldviews between a scientific 
community and its predecessor. Furthermore, historians of science are 
producing anecdotes and evidence that do not align with the conventional 
view of science. Kuhn thus reconstructs the history of science in four stages: 
the pre-paradigm phase, the normal science, the crisis phase and the 
revolutionary science phase.  
 In the pre-paradigm phase, there is no one commonly accepted 
paradigm guiding the research of various scientific communities. Without a 
common paradigm, there was no standard set of methods and phenomena 
that each scientist was compelled to employ and explain145. Once a paradigm 
is generally accepted and its rival theories vanquished, we have entered the 
normal science phase. In this phase, the scientific community works within a 
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paradigm, seeking to determine the significant facts and questions, match 
facts with theory and clarify the theory 146 . In short, the main task of 
researchers is to solve puzzles created by the paradigm. The normal science 
process is highly cumulative in its scope and does not aim at the novelty of fact. 
When anomalies are observed, the paradigm theory will be adjusted till the 
anomalous has become the expected. The crisis stage occurs when attempts to 
explain the anomaly fail repeatedly. Though the scientists will begin to have 
less faith in the puzzle solving ability of the paradigm, they will not abandon it 
till a new candidate emerges to solve the crisis147. 
The central thesis in Kuhn’s book is that science develops through 
revolutions and not through accumulation. Like a gestalt figure, a revolution 
in science occurs when there is a shift in the paradigm, methodology and the 
legitimate set of questions. As such, the new paradigm is incommensurable 
with the old. This does not mean that scientists from one paradigm cannot 
communicate with someone from another paradigm. According to 
philosopher Howard Sankey, the incommensurability thesis consists of three 
claims: when theories are incommensurable, it means that the language of 
such theories is partially or wholly translatable. Subsequently there is no 
logical conflict between the two paradigms since they are judged by two 
different scientific standards and because of that the theories are not 
comparable in content148.  
Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is however not as radical as it seems. 
His argument associates untranslatability with incomparability but the two 
concepts are logically distinct. For it is not the case that there is no common 
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point of reference between the two theories. So although Einstein and Newton 
may mean different things by the word “mass”, their hypotheses can be tested 
against real-life predictions. We are still able to say that Einstein’s theory is 
better than Newton’s laws in prediction. Differences in terminology can be 
settled with reference to a fixed and independent reality.  However, Sankey 
agrees that the terms can remain untranslatable with the same connotation 
and same allusion as the concept in the original paradigm.149 
So partly by selection and partly by omission, scientists of earlier ages 
are implicitly represented as working on the same set of problems. For 
example, Newton wrote that Galileo had discovered that the constant force of 
gravity produces a motion proportional to the square of the time. But in fact 
Galileo’s theory rarely alludes to forces, much less to gravitational force150. As 
different paradigms are built on different metaphysical bases, there is no 
common ontological element that can be found in these different paradigms. 
Only within a normal science phase can there be a progress because the core 
remains unchanged but the transition to another paradigm is not a 
progression towards the same goal. 
To what extent are the insights from the philosophy of science relevant 
to the construction of cultural development? It must be articulated from the 
onset that in cultures, there has never been a normal science phase when only 
one paradigm is commonly accepted in the society. Cultures always exist in 
the “pre-paradigm phase” when there are competing schools of thoughts, even 
if one school may gain most of the adherents. So even in a Western society, 
which is often identified with individualism and liberalism, we still find a large 
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segment of people who are communitarian and conservative. The Bible belt, a 
significant electoral force in America, is an example of the latter. Even in 
Chinese society, which is identified with paternalism and authoritarianism, we 
still find people who hold different sets of beliefs. Thus the debate over Asian 
and Western values is a highly selective process, choosing to place emphasis 
on a particular set of values when there are multiple sets of values to choose 
from.    
Furthermore, the dominance of one set of values can never fully replace 
the old set of values.  We still find a sizeable community whose beliefs differ 
from the mainstream and who believe in “discarded” or “unfashionable” ideas. 
While no current scientific community is interested in Aristotelian science, 
there are still significant groups, philosophers for example, who are interested 
in Aristotelian thought.  Even at the height of imperialism, the colonial 
masters could suppress but not get rid of the indigenous cultures.  Certain 
values may be mainstream for a long period of time but when they are 
replaced, it does not mean their destruction but rather, a re-ordering of their 
roles in the public and private spheres.  
It is thus an unfortunate and often disastrous mistake, to eliminate all 
other cultures so that only one culture will dominate, such as what happened 
during the height of Cultural Revolution in China. The error in thought occurs 
when thinkers and leaders try to import the scientific ideal of a unitary 
paradigm into the cultural field. The idea of a universal civilization, 
monoculturalism and the preservation of a core culture that precludes other 
cultures are based on this unfortunate mistake. Science believes in the 
discovery of an ultimate formula that will explain all natural phenomena and 




make it a totalitarian society. Thus if we believe that at any one time, there can 
only be a single culture, then plurality and diversity will be seen as a 
perversion of the natural development.  
Therefore, Huntington’s assumption of homogeneity in civilization has 
to be modified to take into the account the heterogeneity within a civilization. 
Even within a totalitarian country where plurality of opinions is condemned 
and deviation from official lines is met with prosecution, we still witness more 
than one dominant viewpoint, championed especially by rebel groups. The 
Orwellian society where everyone thinks the same way because they speak the 
same language is unlikely to be realized because diversity of thoughts. The 
human ability to innovate, to create new meanings out of old symbols, is what 
gives rise to multiplicities of interpretations. 
This brings us to an important point. Since a culture can seldom be 
truly eliminated, its continued existence does not necessarily mean that it still 
retains orthodoxy. When a culture or a particular metaphysical framework no 
longer governs the behaviour of the majority, we can say that a revolution has 
occurred. Thus, while Britain remains a product of Christianity, the attack of 
Darwinism has severely weakened the hold of Christianity on popular mindset. 
Secularism has replaced Christianity as the dominant ethos.  In the same way, 
Confucianism, while remaining an important Chinese heritage does not factor 
in many modern Chinese’s mindset. What we have nowadays is a pale version 
of Confucianism, with its emphasis on filial piety and loyalty, without the 
complete set of rituals that accompanied it. This is why several Chinese 
scholars have noted that though Chinese all over the world may celebrate 
similar festivals, they do not necessarily subscribe to traditional Chinese 




they may do so out of tradition but they do not see the Bible as an authority in 
their daily lives.  
Hence in any society, there can be one or more than one dominant 
culture, with numerous sub-cultures. They interact constantly with one 
another to produce hybrid cultures and new perspectives. At the same time, 
they are in competition with one another to fight for supremacy and 
significance in the society.  This captures the dynamism of culture.  Though 
interactions and competitions are rife, the dominant culture can usually 
remain so for a long period of time because its values are aligned to people’s 
concept of happiness, with constant refinement and adaptation. This leads to 
the stability of the dominant culture.  Only when crisis strikes or when a 
challenger culture is able to present a better vision of the good life would the 
dominant culture be seriously challenged.  
Another difference between the scientific enterprise and cultural life is 
that while the former is mainly engaged in puzzle solving in the normal 
science phase, a cultural paradigm is engrossed with the question of how to 
lead a good life. If the majority decides that individualism is the best way to 
lead the good way, then much resources and time will be devoted to 
articulating this vision of the good life. Social, economical and political 
systems will be built upon this. In such a society, the appeal to the ideal is 
often used to justify actions, whether or not the actions do in fact cohere with 
the vision. Politicians too will incorporate these ideals in their political 
agendas and often try to discourage other visions of life, for the purpose of 
building an integrated community.  
The vision of the good life must be able to help people cope with 




natural disasters, a change in global situation, a scientific revolution or an 
invasion from an aggressive country.  When a crisis occurs, people do not 
abandon the paradigm of the good life but will try to accommodate the 
changes within the framework. So a Christian may see an act of great suffering 
as a way for God to test his faith and mould his character. The suffering is then 
not seen as distraction from the good life but a necessary path to take. As long 
as the paradigm is able to give satisfactory answers to changing circumstances, 
it will remain a dominant paradigm. This is the process of evolution and 
adaptation. Practices and rules can change to uphold the greater ideas.  
Since the dominant paradigm is seen as a wise approach to life, an 
important process then is to socialize newcomers to the norms. Children are 
taught since young to observe the rules laid down in the society. Rewards and 
incentives will be given for obedience while deviation will be met with 
admonition and punishment. It is no contradiction that an ideology like 
individualism requires social effort. For children are taught from young to rely 
on themselves and even their role models will be people who exude the kind of 
behaviour.  Socialization does not just stop at home but is an integrated 
process. The education system and career opportunities will favour those who 
follow the ideology but penalize those who are different.  
It does not of course mean that everyone will endorse this vision and 
there are likely a sizeable number of people who value other forms of lives. 
Often the group can be a large one, creating a big sub-culture. They can be 
ostracized by the community for persisting in alternative lifestyles. But 
nonetheless it cannot be denied that these groups are engaged in the search 
for the good life. That is captured in the Socratic Paradox where people do 




term “good” is an ambiguous term, which simply means doing whatever is 
seen as beneficial. A smoker, for example, may be fully aware of the dangers of 
smoking but nonetheless, as long as he can see that there is some good in this 
behaviour, such as the relief of stress, he will continue to do so. In a society 
that strongly endorses vegetarianism as the good, consumption of meat will be 
seen as a harmful thing to do, even though many societies see it as a harmless 
act. The ability to convince these minority groups to adopt the more common 
vision of the good life lies largely in the ability to convince them that their 
visions of the good life can be better realised by following the majority. But no 
matter how persuasive a person is, it is not likely that the society will endorse 
one version of the good life.   
The essentialist view that there is only one ideal of the good life is thus 
questionable. It believes that if we apply our rational faculty and exert 
ourselves, we shall come to the agreement that there is one version of the good, 
which underlies all conceptions of the good. So the idea of a core essence of a 
civilization means that people from the same culture throughout the ages and 
in different parts of the world can agree to the ideal of the good life. But the 
idea is problematic because the same act, say consumption of meat, can be a 
good thing to one person but a bad thing to another.  
Berlin, when talking about incommensurability agrees that the ends of 
life can never converge at a single point. Differences about the end of life must 
exist. That does not equate to relativism. Relativism is the inability to point 
out the truth and falsehood of value system. We can certainly condemn the 
Nazi’s act of cruelty and Osama’s contempt of human life. Instead Berlin gives 
us the idea of pluralism—“the conception that there are many different ends 




understanding each and sympathizing and deriving light from each other, as 
we derive it from reading Plato or the novels of medieval Japan—world, 
outlooks, very remote from our own”151 
 When applied to cultural studies, this implies that there is still a 
standard by which we can judge illiberal and immoral cultures. Thus even 
though different cultures may possess different conceptions of the good, they 
can come to an agreement in terms of “thin” morality such as no random 
violence and reckless killing. The concept of trust is important as well. 
Without this basic moral concept, interaction is almost impossible because 
there is deep suspicion among people. So for practical reasons, this thin 
conception of morality is endorsed by many cultures despite differences in 
other parts of culture such as aesthetics.  
As long as people find that the conception of the good can help them 
live a fulfilling life, they will continue believing in it. But a crisis may strike in 
such a devastating way that the dominant paradigm is unable to explain it 
satisfactorily. Then it will pave the way for a cultural revolution—a change in 
worldview and attitudes toward life. This happened during the Islamic 
Resurgence in the 1970s, when the Arab community, weary of corruption and 
oppression, decided to revive the role of religion. The May-Fourth Movement 
was also a campaign to arrest the decline of the Chinese civilization by turning 
towards science and democracy. The nature of a cultural revolution will be 
elaborated in the next section.  
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II Cultural Revolution  
In the previous section, I have discussed the importance of a revolution 
in cultural development and because of how Thomas Kuhn has characterized 
the transition from one paradigm to another, it seems that the move to 
another paradigm is a sudden one. This section attempts to show that a 
revolution is not a sudden imposition of an idea from another culture (the 
culture need not be from a foreign land but can be indigenous) but a 
sophisticated and protracted process of negotiation and dialogue. It is 
important to understand that an intercultural exchange is accomplished by 
individuals who are well versed in both cultures and is usually not the 
consequence of an organic growth. As a result, the essence of the indigenous 
culture will be transformed and cannot remain the same as it was in the past. 
That is a challenge to Huntington’s claim that different non-Western 
civilizations will only modernize but their core cultural values still remain the 
same152.  
Changes to culture can of course come about suddenly and without 
sufficient dialogue. This has happened to countries that are conquered by 
outside forces or rocked by sudden revolutions. All these result in socially and 
politically unstable countries. For example, by imposing an abstract idea of a 
democratic republic and forcefully eradicating tradition, French intellectuals 
had not been able to successfully integrate the new ideals with the existing 
traditions. As a result, 150 years after the French Revolution, France went 
through “two monarchies, two empires, five republics and one proto-fascist 
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dictatorship”153.  We can also think of the failure of Communism to last long in 
China as the failure to engage with the indigenous culture. However, when I 
use the term “cultural revolution”, I mean not the absence of dialogue but a 
shift in worldviews due to cultural dialogues. It also does not mean the 
wholesale replacement of the old values. Certain sacred beliefs are challenged 
in each revolution and over time and over numerous revolutions, even the 
most sacred beliefs can be challenged.  
An important question as to how intercultural exchanges can take place 
must be settled. If different paradigms have different standards and different 
concepts, how can there be a meaningful speech? But it must be remembered 
that though the dominant culture may not share identical concepts with 
another culture, they still have similar concepts (like self, family and gender). 
The facts that we are living in the same reality and there are common human 
experiences help in clarification of meaning even if the terms have different 
connotations. So when intercultural exchange takes place, there are concepts 
in one culture that are analogous to concepts in the other culture154.  
There are two main ways by which a society can acquire a new of beliefs 
and overthrow the old set of beliefs. The revolution can come from within, 
meaning that it takes place as a result of individual enlightenment and even 
revelation. This would include the Reformation or the Islamic Resurgence in 
the 1970s. The second way it can take place is in the form of interculturalism, 
an integration of two cultures, whether indigenous or foreign.  This would 
include the fusion of Confucianism and Taoism to form Neo-Taoism. In this 
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thesis, I should focus on interculturalism though the process of cultural 
change can be similarly extended to a cultural revolution from within.  
In the subsequent text, I shall argue that intercultural exchanges should 
be conceived as a revolution in cultural development, not as an expansion and 
accumulation of the preceding culture. Interculturalism recognizes that 
cultures interact creatively, giving rise to a product that is vastly different from 
the inputs and one way to illustrate this is to look at an intercultural film, 
specifically, Akira Kurosawa’s Kumonosu-ju. Though Kurosawa’s work cannot 
be said to have started a cultural revolution, which would involve replacement 
of the dominant culture, it is useful to illustrate the concept of cultural 
interaction. Cultural interaction takes place over a long period of time, and the 
process cannot be as readily seen as in an intercultural film. Kurosawa’s film is 
a work that marries traditions separated by hundreds of miles and aptly 
demonstrates the mobility of cultures. Kurosawa’s film retains so little of 
Shakespeare’s play that we ask if faithfulness is a good criterion to start with. 
Unlike earlier adaptations, Kurosawa has brought Macbeth to a foreign land 
and told the tale in symbols appropriate to the indigenous culture.  
Instead of importing elements like Christian doctrines and Greek 
theatre from Shakespeare’s Macbeth to Kumonosu-ju, Kurosawa has replaced 
them with Buddhist philosophy and Noh theatre. As Buddhism permeates the 
film, the same story of betrayal takes on a different symbolism, illustrating the 
primacy of a paradigm. The questions that we ask in Shakespeare’s Macbeth 
are no longer meaningful and significant here. For example, instead of having 
three omniscient witches in a subtle mockery of the Holy Trinity, Kurosawa 




ethics in Noh fashion155. The circular structure of the film—with the characters 
going around the forest in circles, the spinning wheel and numerous 
repetitions—emphasize the crushing laws of karma where freedom does not 
exist156 (which is a major theme in Macbeth). As a result, all scenes of pathos 
and acknowledged guilt in Macbeth are eliminated157 from Kumonosu-ju. The 
end result is that Kurosawa has created an unheroic film tragedy158.  
  If Macbeth is characterized by themes of free will, guilt and pathos, the 
form of Greek tragedy, Shakespeare’s soliloquies and the three witches, then 
Kumonosu-ju is not a mere adaptation of Macbeth though the storyline and 
characterization bear close resemblance to Macbeth. This is what happens 
during an intercultural exchange—a familiar part of a culture enters an 
unfamiliar sphere and becomes radically transformed by the new paradigm. 
Like in a scientific revolution, what was once a rabbit has become a duck. 
Consequently we have difficulty interpreting the symbols with the usual 
paradigm and articulating the very nature of the cultural hybrid. The hybrids 
promote a new area of meaning and representation that is incomprehensible 
and unrecognizable in terms of prevailing knowledge. Kurosawa’s film can be 
seen as a microcosm of what happens when cultures interact in a creative 
fashion.  This is simply a case of intercultural exchange without being an 
intercultural revolution, which would mean that the new sub-culture has been 
accepted as norms and values of primary importance by the masses and has 
replaced the old paradigm.   
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To illustrate a cultural revolution, we should study the formation of 
Ch’an Buddhism. Today, Ch’an Buddhism is seen as a part of Chinese culture 
but when Buddhism was first introduced to China, the Chinese resisted its 
influence because of its insistence on celibacy and its Indian origins. It was 
seen as un-Chinese159. Outlook of life is radically different. While Buddhism 
expresses contempt for the world and disgust with life, both Taoism and early 
Confucianism express the love of life and much emphasis is placed on living 
well in this world, rather than an inquiry into the afterlife. Even Taoist’s quest 
for immortality is to extend life in this world160.   Neither is Ch’an Buddhism a 
mere extension of Buddhism. Instead of pessimism and denial of worldliness, 
Ch’an Buddhism reaffirms life and acceptance of this world 161 . Besides, 
influenced by Taoism, Ch’an Buddhism places emphasis on intuitive 
understanding, rejecting conceptual thinking and external influences162.  
Likewise, indigenous Chinese culture was transformed when Buddhism 
entered the scene. Taoism was systematized as a religion, borrowing from the 
organizational system of Buddhist monastery. It became concerned with 
spiritual afterlife rather than bodily immortality. Early Confucianism was not 
concerned with metaphysics but with a sophisticated metaphysical framework, 
Ch’an Buddhism created a demand for metaphysical arguments and thus Neo-
Confucianism was born, with much attention to yin-yang cosmology and 
bordered on mysticism. Confucian scholars often speak of preserving tradition 
rather than innovation but if one compares early Confucianism with Neo-
Confucianism, the changes are fundamental.  
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Of course, the introduction of Buddhism did not lead to “Indianization” 
of China163. Indianization of China would have to import more of its culture 
like Hinduism, its history and its social and political systems. Buddhism was 
just a part of Indian civilization. We must remember that when Christianity 
was spread to Europe, it did not lead to Israelization of Europe. That would be 
placing too much expectation on the cultural exchanges. But nonetheless, 
fundamental changes occur when such intercultural exchanges happen. 
Huntington’s view seems to be that Buddhism is merely an expansion of the 
Chinese culture, a selected import of certain practices but the underlying 
worldview remains firmly Chinese. He assumes that even after the exchange, 
one can still identify distinctly the part that belongs to Chinese culture and the 
part that belongs to Buddhism. But the old categories are gone and replaced 
with new ones. As I have shown earlier, there are certain fundamental changes. 
Buddhism introduces the concepts of heaven and hell, the notion of fatalism, 
and also makes certain practices seen as possible notions of the good life—like 
celibacy and vegetarianism. It also impacts literature, philosophy and even 
policies. 
 The piecemeal approach can be seen in Huntington’s construction of 
the history of American identity. Huntington claims that America has gone 
through changes in its identity but still retains its cultural core. Although the 
racial and ethnic components of American identity have diminished, the 
Anglo-Protestant core still remains undisturbed. It seems that he has 
compartmentalized these different identities. In actual fact, these ideas are 
inter-connected. In the past, Christianity was used to justify slavery and 
racism. Thus changes in the concepts of race and ethnicity have repercussions 
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on the Anglo-Protestant culture just like how the Copernican Revolution led to 
a reformulation of the relationship between God and man.    
Seen in this light, it is untenable to claim that a part of a culture can 
remain the same while others are changed. But that is the kind of claim that 
Huntington often makes. He says, “If non-Western societies are to modernize, 
they must do it their own way not the Western way and emulating Japan, 
build upon and employ their own traditions, institutions and values.”164 But 
the strict demarcation between modernization and Westernization cannot 
stand. Western values like the rule of law, democracy and representative 
bodies have been adopted by numerous countries like Taiwan, Japan and 
Singapore in their process of modernization. These values are not subsidiary 
to the indigenous values but are core values.  That is why Singapore’s robust 
legal system stands in contrast to China’s legal system.  The British had 
infused the respect for the law into the Singapore culture as the migrants did 
not have such a concept when they first came to Singapore.  
Huntington has defined a culture as “values, norms, institutions and 
modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society attached 
primary importance”165. If a set of worldviews and norms defines a culture, 
then we can say that Chinese culture had departed from its characteristics 
when Buddhism or the rule of law was introduced. We are inclined to think of 
an expansion in Chinese culture but that is to assume that there is a central set 
of values that remains unchanged and defines one as “Chinese”.  Earlier, the 
difficulty of defining Kumonosu-ju as a mere adaptation crops up since the 
underpinning paradigms, which are so central to Macbeth, are swept away 
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and replaced with elements so alien to Macbeth. Similarly, worldviews 
underwent changes when Ch’an Buddhism met Confucianism. The former 
discarded its pessimistic worldview that formed an indispensable part of 
Buddhism while Neo-Confucianism started to focus on metaphysical 
questions, which were not crucial to earlier Confucians. So when an 
intercultural exchange happens, a cultural hybrid is born which is not 
reducible to its parent culture. The cultural hybrid will present a different 
paradigm, acquire a different set of symbols and asks a different repertoire of 
questions.  
To illustrate divergent worldviews, consider the claim that Western 
culture is a continuation of Greek culture. The recent debate between Martha 
Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam on the one hand and M. F. Burnyeat on the 
other over the Aristotelian phrase “taking on form without matter” 
demonstrates the gulf in thinking between Aristotle and modern readers. If 
Burnyeat is right, Aristotelian thinking is most alien to ours, which is 
Cartesian outlook. Aristotle believes that there is no physiological and 
material process that stands to a perceiver’s awareness of warmth, colour and 
smell166.  Thus, “receiving the warmth of a warm thing without its matters 
means becoming warm without really becoming warm; it means registering, 
noticing the warmth without actually becoming warm”167. This is the most 
bizarre way of thinking but if we truly want to say that modern culture builds 
on Greek culture, we will be bound with contradictions.  Unless we recognize 
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that worldviews have changed and cultures do not have linear histories, we 
will continue holding on to the accumulation theory of cultural development. 
 Or consider the often-repeated statement that modern day European 
culture is built upon Christianity and Roman cultures. However the central 
symbol of the crucifix has different meaning in Christianity and the Roman 
culture. Under Roman laws, crucifixion was the worst form of criminal 
punishment and it was a symbol of shame and guilt. However within the 
Christian context, the crucifix is a symbol of hope and resurrection. And where 
traditionally the crucifix was worn purely as a religious ornament, it has now 
turned into a fashion statement. In the most obvious act of breaking away 
from its part, the European Union has rejected Christianity as its cultural 
heritage while drawing up its constitution. Thus claiming that modern 
European culture is built upon Christianity and Roman culture is to 
misrepresent the process of cultural development.  
Hitherto, we have been speaking of a cultural hybrid as it stands apart 
from the parent cultures and is distinguishable from them. But that is a false 
image. Unlike Kurosawa’s films where intercultural exchanges are frozen in 
time and crystallize on films, cultural hybrids become less delineated over 
time. Gradually, a cultural hybrid transposes from the peripheral to 
mainstream culture. We should remember that when Buddhism was first 
introduced, it was seen as an Indian influence but slowly became part of the 
Chinese culture. Antagonism towards foreign influences will subside when 
these alien elements are naturalized and normalized. Though the core values 
have changed, we are still able to recognize it as Chinese civilization even 
though our core values are different from our ancestors’. This is akin to what 




to think of the stable outcomes of past revolutions168 and cultures, rather than 
going through revolutions, merely expand.  This has lent support to the 
essentialist model of culture where there is a set of core values that survives 
changes and defines a cultural group.  
Just like in science when we are led to think that scientists of earlier 
ages are working on the same set of problems, so we are led to think that 
people of the earlier ages adopt the same concept of the good life. But 
examining historical texts will convince us that people in the past differ 
fundamentally with modern people in their worldview, in their metaphysical 
assumptions and what is seen as the good life. In Huntington’s account of 
civilization, the identity of a culture is a given, a neutral choice made by 
generations of people. Thus it is right to protect the incumbent. However, as 
shown in the alternative account, the choice of textbooks and the core values 
of a civilization are highly contested concepts and to see cultures as value-
blind is to privilege the existing culture.    
In the closing chapter of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn 
proposes that scientific growth is not goal-directed and the idea of progress 
has to be modified.  Inevitably this has caused much disagreement in the 
academic circle. Without adding on to the ongoing debate, I shall say that the 
insight from his book is more applicable to the development of cultures than 
science. We have seen the rise and fall of cultures that were once thought to be 
invincible and at the peak of their power. For example, no one in the 15th 
century would have thought Islamic civilization and Chinese civilization to 
land in a backward condition in the early twentieth century. In the same way, 
no one would have expected which colony to prosper and which would wither.  
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What really causes the rise of civilizations is individual leadership and what 
usually causes the fall of civilizations are leaders who lead their countries on 
the wrong paths of action, like Hitler and Mussolini.  
But there is a more profound reason why an intercultural exchange 
does not necessarily lead to progress (though it often does). This applies to 
movements to abolish past traditions and movements to revive traditions. 
Consider Communism in China. Chairman Mao Zedong criticized 
Confucianism as being out-dated, feudalistic and oppressive and saw his 
movement as a progress towards a better life. But within a few decades, 
Communism was seen as too idealistic in its assumptions and rather than 
solving the problems of poverty and inequitable distribution of wealth, it 
created more problems. The Enlightenment looked upon the Middle Ages as 
the “Dark Ages” but in the end, the age created colonialism and oppression of 
other cultures. The transition to a new cultural paradigm is not solely a 
rational move but one that is enveloped in emotions, politics, prejudices, etc. 
At times, the need to end a crisis is so strong that any alternative paradigm is 
seen as a better one.  
Similarly, after years of social instability, the Taleban sought to bring 
forth progress in Afghanistan by restricting the movement of women and 
banning all forms of entertainment. Thinking that their pure form of Islam 
could solve all the moral and social problems, they were in fact too legalistic. 
The regime failed partly because the leaders did not understand human 
motivation and the nature of problems. Puritanism too lost popularity because 
it became too legalistic. Revivals or movements to return to a purer age can be 
dangerous because the revivalists may not appreciate the gap in worldview 




the substance. The conception of the good life may work in a society in the 
past but may not do so in the modern world.  
Every leader or thinker may think that he is bringing progress to his 
country but he should carefully analyse the actual problems and not blindly 
impose a solution that may create more problems as a result. The existing 
cultural paradigm may not necessarily be a progress towards a better life. As 
Albright has noted in Chapter 5, decent people can commit acts of atrocities 
because they think they are pursuing the good life. Since a young person’s 
conception of the good life is largely shaped by the society till he can think 
otherwise, we should constantly examine our goals for we could be pursuing 
the wrong goals.   
 The foregoing paragraphs point out certain characteristics of a 
civilization that is obscured by the essentialist view. The first is that although 
the previously dominant values and institutions of a civilization still exist, it 
does not mean core values remain the same. Churches, celebration of 
Christian-related festivals and Christians are still prominent in Europe and 
America but the roles they play have shifted. One clear sign is that they do not 
define the good life for the majority in society.  
 Second, values, history and worldview are highly contested concepts 
and there are no givens in a culture.  Co-existing with the dominant culture 
are other sets of culture and to choose a set of values as the dominant one is a 
political choice.  Thus there is no single Islamic culture but multiple Islamic 
cultures. 
Third, the core values of a culture are the results of interaction with 
other cultures over time. The thesis is not disputing constancy in values within 




should not be mistaken for essentialism. While it cannot be denied that a 
culture is distinct from another, the distinction must not be made to the 
exclusion of intercultural influence, which would make the boundaries less 
clearly demarcated. Huntington’s error is to treat the accidental as essential, 
the relative as absolute. For a culture no longer retains its essential 
characteristics such as its worldview, its symbolism, its norms and the range 
of appropriate questions after an intercultural exchange.  
 Fourth, the cultural hybrid, which initially can stand distinct from the 
parent cultures subsequently transforms the parent cultures and becomes the 
convention. Once that happens, the culture has changed its essential 
characteristics and identity.  After the cultural hybrid has become mainstream, 
textbooks and history will be changed accordingly to create the impression of 
a linear history, ignoring the change in the conception of the good life and the 
highly political process of representation.  
 Fifth, the existing cultural paradigm may not necessarily be a progress 
towards a better life so there is a constant need to examine cultural norms. 
Cultural essentialism, for example, is fashionable now but politicians, thinkers 












Chapter 7: Philosophy and Policy 
 
The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life 
imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from 
the habitual beliefs of his age or his nations, and from his 
convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-
operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such man the 
world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects 
rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are 
contemptuously rejected.  
Bertrand Russell 
The Problems of Philosophy 
 
I Framing the Problems 
In politics as well as in daily life, how one frames the problem will influence 
how one solves it. From previous chapters, I have shown that views about 
cultures and civilizations can be divided into two major camps. On the one 
side is cultural essentialism, as espoused by Huntington and Weber. 
Huntington believes that there are traits or values that are unchanging and 
indispensable to a particular culture. These traits are then used to predict the 
outcome of the civilizations and cultures. Max Weber believes that the 
Protestant ethic was what brought about prosperity in America and Northern 
Europe and the lack of it in other parts of the world would hamper the process 
of modernization. But in Huntington’s hands, the concept of cultural 
determinism is not used to predict the wealth and poverty of nations but to 




will not give up those cultural values. If values in a civilization are the 
problems and these values cannot be changed despite “political, social, 
economic and even ideological upheavals”, then the role of the individual must 
be subservient to the forces of these large and immutable values.  
On the other hand, there is another camp which believes that political 
leadership can triumph over differences between cultural values, no matter 
how deeply rooted these values are. Proponents include Zakaria and Berlin. 
While acknowledging the powerful pull of customary rules, Zakaria thinks that 
policies, not culture will ultimately determine the level of prosperity and peace 
in a country. Berlin makes a stronger case of individual leadership by 
attacking the tenets of essentialism. Determinism is the application of the 
scientific method to the studies of humanities but there is a crucial difference 
between scientific laws and laws which purport to describe human behaviour. 
A good scientific law can describe all physical objects without exception but 
human behaviour cannot be captured by any deterministic principle.  
 The doctrine of cultural determinism though attractive in its simplicity 
does not address the complex issues of free will. Culture can change its course 
of development and reject its previous values because of thinkers, leaders and 
politicians. These great individuals can destroy a civilization or bring a 
civilization up from its state of hopelessness. This is why civilizations can rise 
and fall. Thus, in my account of cultural development in the previous chapter, 
there is no marked direction that a culture will head towards. There is no 
teleological end because the destination is not fixed. At any point in time, a 
great civilization can crumble because of the presence of bad leaders. Similarly, 




 In The 9/11 Commission Report, the commission notes that vague goals 
will result in vague strategies. Thus, the task of defeating Al-Qaeda seems 
insurmountable as it is painted as an organization with extensive worldview 
connections and resilient in character169. The same applies to Huntington’s 
description of the source of disputes in the world. If Islam were indeed a 
civilization of violence, what kind of policy would be helpful to prevent a clash 
among civilizations? Certainly the proposed plan to form a set of shared values 
will fail to take off because coming to such consensus will be difficult, if not 
impossible in Huntington’s framework. Huntington has created a problem 
that defies his solution.  
 Logically, if Islam were violent in nature, the only correct policy to take 
would be to destroy the religion. That is certainly not a feasible solution and 
neither is it the right thing to do.  However The 9/11 Commission Report is 
wise enough to narrow the blame to the Al-Qaeda network.  The organization 
is bent on destroying not just America but Muslim nations that do not support 
its cause. In narrowing its problem to an organization, the problem becomes 
much easier. Of course, it is not a matter of expediency but accuracy in 
identifying the enemy.  
 The failure to identify the correct enemy and ally may account for the 
drop in support for America in many Muslim countries. Polls in 2002 
indicated that in Egypt and Saudi Arabia that are American allies, less than 
15% of the population had a favourable opinion of America. In contrast to the 
warm support America had in its war against terrorism right after September 
11, favourable ratings for the U.S. have fallen throughout the Muslim world—
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from 61% to 15% in Indonesia and a drop from 71% to 38% among Muslims in 
Nigeria. These are sobering statistics and should alert any policy makers to the 
failure of the war of ideas in the Islamic World.170 
In its simplistic generalization, the U.S. continues to equate Islam with 
the Arabs and has not seriously looked at moderate Muslim nations outside of 
the Middle East as possible allies. The Straits Times Journalist Roger Mitton 
comments that most Americans, even those in the highest reaches of the 
administration fail to understand the significant achievement of Malaysian 
Prime Minister Abdullah in turning back the tide of support for the 
fundamentalist party of PAS. But by equating Islam with all undesirable 
qualities, the U.S. administration has failed to see that democracy and the 
respect for human rights has already taken place in many Muslim nations in 
Southeast Asia and these models can serve as a good example to those in the 
Middle East171. 
We can learn from how Abdullah won the war of ideas. The rise in 
Muslim fundamentalism started with the unceremonious removal of the then-
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. The court trial was seen as 
unfair and politically motivated and in the end, he was sentenced to 15 years 
imprisonment for abuse of power and sodomy. A majority of the Muslim 
population was upset by such unfair treatment of the popular leader. When 
the election took place in the following year, not only did the ruling coalition 
continue to lose the state of Kelantan, it unexpectedly lost the state of 
Terengganu to the Islamic fundamentalist party PAS. Thus the new state 
government began to introduce illiberal policies like gender discrimination, 
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the banning of entertainment and decapitating of limbs for stealing and other 
felonies. It fueled the unfortunate stereotype of Muslims as fundamentalists 
and before election 2004, it seemed that Muslims in the moderate Malaysia 
were caught in the worrying trend of intolerance.   
But with the rise of the new prime minister and his vow to rid 
corruption and poverty, restore independence to the judiciary and to ensure 
racial harmony, the ruling party managed to wrest control of Terengganu and 
drastically weaken the opposition’s hold on the state of Kelantan. Abdullah 
had won more than 90% of popular votes, the best election results for the 
ruling party ever since independence. The election demonstrated that 
extremism could be curbed by addressing underlying problems of injustice, 
unfairness and discrimination. This should be the approach taken by countries 
that are facing uprising and riots from their minority groups. Rather than 
resorting to violence, the governments should address the underlying 
problems.   
In a sense, the violence in Russia and Thailand is also the failure of the 
war of ideas. These two countries employ the use of force frequently but 
neglect the struggle of ideas. If one reads the account of groups that are in 
conflict, certain traits of the other groups are often described in absolute 
terms. “Chechnya equals crime and violence in the eyes of most Russians”. 172 
In such an atmosphere of distrust and hatred, it is perhaps hard to conceive of 
the enemies as otherwise. But individuals and politicians should not confuse 
what is essentially a political problem with a cultural one. The culture of 
violence, if one looks hard enough, has its roots in policy failure. The dilemma 
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is that by framing the issue in terms of cultural determinism, individuals and 
politicians are effectively limiting their options in reacting towards violence.  
 The danger of cultural determinism is that a set of cultural values will 
predispose people within a culture to act in a certain way, obliterating human 
autonomy and freedom. When a particular cultural rule becomes law, it 
becomes necessary to obey the cultural imperative. The cycle of violence can 
continue for decades or even centuries unless there are brave leaders to stop 
the spirit of vengeance.  It seems most natural to inflict the same kind of 
damage and loss upon the enemy but committing more wrongs cannot rectify 
the problems. Forgiveness must come and after which leaders should try to 
rebuild countries that are devastated by war. That is how Germany and Japan, 
who had inflicted much suffering on their neighbours during the World War II 
become healthy members of the international community. But the task of 
forgiveness is not a limited franchise. When a commoner like Gordon Wilson 
chooses to forgive his enemies rather than pursue endless revenge, he can put 
an end to bloodshed and begin the process of reconciliation. Thus great men 
need not be people holding high political posts but can be ordinary citizens 
who are willing to challenge the norms and inspire changes.  
Revolutions can happen to cultural values because of great leaders and 
thinkers. They may be victims of injustice and unfairness but they can choose 
the path of forgiveness and not follow the law of vengeance.  There may be a 
clash of civilizations but people have the choice not to obey what the culture or 
leaders dictate. This is of course a hard process and there are formidable 
obstacles to solving long conflicts.  The dilemma of the situation is that in 




effecting changes; but it is precisely in these countries that individual actions 
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